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This thesis aims at shading light on three issues which are at the forefront of the European
Commission’s agenda. The ﬁrst two chapters deal with the issue of state subsidies and their impact
on market competition and development. Both papers design a theoretical setting where such
impact can be assessed and provide for the tools needed for welfare analysis. The third chapter,
instead, is mainly empirical and aims at measuring the eﬀect on competition due to an increase
in advertising in the context of public procurement auctions. Throughout this introduction, I
will brieﬂy describe the motivation and the main insights underlying each chapter.
State aid control is one of the main activity of the European Competition Authority. Accord-
ing to the provision reported in the EU Treaty, a state aid is an advantage granted on a selective
basis to undertakings by national public authorities. As only some of the (actual or potential)
competitors in a market are entitled to get the aid, anytime that such aid is granted, reasonable
concerns about a consequential harmful distortion of competition arise. A ﬁrm which gets a sub-
sidy might be able to drive out from the market a competitor which is not entitled to get it or it
might prevent other ﬁrms to enter the market. The same ﬁrm might decide to reduce its eﬀorts
in developing a better technology which could reduce its costs, because the aid turned it to be not
worthy doing. Firms might ﬁnd unproﬁtable to invest in innovative activities if their competitors
have higher chances to achieve good results thanks to government intervention. And so forth:
the list could be much longer. For that reason, the EU Treaty contains a general prohibition of
state aid.
The Treaty, however, provides for several exceptions to this ban. The exceptions broadly refer
to those cases where the distortion of competition due to the adoption of a state aid system is more
than oﬀset by its beneﬁt. Indeed, state aid can be used to stimulate the development of backward
economic areas, to rescue ﬁrms which are experiencing temporary diﬃculties or to facilitate ﬁrms
to access ﬁnancial markets and funding innovative projects. Thus, if speciﬁc conditions are met,
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a Member State can be allowed to use subsidy, provided that it has a positive eﬀect on social
welfare.
Due to information availability and time constraints the Competition Authority is not always
able to check whether that speciﬁc state aid had a positive impact on welfare, though. It turns
o u tt h a ts o m eper se rules are needed in order to facilitate the screening of those aid schemes
which potentially have a negative impact on welfare. One of these rules (which is more properly
an established practice) concerns the shape of the aid: according to the European Commission,
subsidies which lower ﬁrms’ variable cost are more distortive than subsidies which lower ﬁrms’
ﬁxed entry cost. The purpose of the ﬁrst chapter "European State Aid Policy: Should Variable
Cost Aid Be Banned?" is to analyze that statement and check whether it is correct or not.
This question is rather new to the literature: Garcia and Neven (2005) are the ﬁrst to propose
a comparison between variable and ﬁxed cost aid, but in their analysis the government’s choice is
exogenous and no welfare evaluation of diﬀerent government’s policies can be provided. Chapter
1 instead introduces a simple model where the eﬀect of a general ban of variable cost aid (VCA )
by a supra-national Authority can be assessed according to the endogenous choices implemented
by Member States. The model shows that if the minimum VCAnecessary to make the entrant
break even and enter the market does not cause an incumbent ﬁrm to exit the market, then
the only type of aid which can occur at the equilibrium is VCA , whatever is the shadow cost
of subsidization. This happens because while ﬁxed cost aid (FCA) has a positive impact on
welfare which is given by an increase in competition, VCAhas an additional positive eﬀect which
is due to an increase in the eﬃciency of one of the competing ﬁrms. Given these ﬁndings, the
model shows that a general ban of VCAis unlikely to be an optimal policy. Indeed, Chapter
1 reaches the following conclusions: the European Commission should not prevent governments
to use VCAif the competing ﬁrms do not belong to the European Union or if the Commission
adopts a consumer surplus standard and the unique case in which prohibiting VCAis welfare
enhancing occurs only when the incumbent ﬁrm originates from a Member State which is not the
one granting the aid.
Diﬃculties in accessing ﬁnancial market is claimed to be one of the main factors hampering
innovation in Europe. Firms may have good projects without being able to raise the ﬁnancial
resources needed to develop them due to lack of information available to investors. The European
Commission reckons this issue to be particularly relevant for small and young enterprises and
thus lets Member States implement aid schemes which stimulate innovation of ﬁrms which are
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smaller or younger than speciﬁc thresholds. The purpose of Chapter 2, "Innovation Subsidies
and Imperfect Financial Market: Should Small or Young Firms Be Subsidized?", is to analyze
the impact of a state aid system according to the size or age of ﬁrms, namely to their ability to
get funded by banks.
The idea that small or young ﬁrms are more aﬀected by market failures is well accepted in
the literature (see for example Beck - 2005). This does not mean that subsidizing those ﬁrms
is necessarily welfare enhancing: indeed, subsidizing ﬁr m sw h i c ha r em o r ea ﬀected by market
failures obviously entails higher costs. Chapter 2 extends the basic model of Holmström and
Tirole (1997) introducing asymmetries among ﬁrms by considering the amount of information
available to banks, which diﬀers from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. The model shows that, within this setting, a
state aid policy which targets only small or young ﬁrms maximizes total welfare if the proportion
of ﬁrms with high probability of success in the economy is suﬃciently high. That happens because,
even if it is more costly to grant a subsidy to a small or young ﬁrm, the positive impact of the
subsidy on innovation more than oﬀsets that cost, since the aid targets ﬁrms which more likely
strictly need it in order to innovate. The model moreover shows that the optimal state aid policy
always implies a proportion of ﬁrms which do not get the aid even if they would need it in order
to innovate. This proportion depends positively on the total cost of investment and negatively
on the proportion of ﬁr m sw i t hh i g hi n n o v a t i v ea b i l i t yi nt h ee c o n o m y .
In addition, Chapter 2 proposes an alternative aid scheme in which the aid is granted only
after the ﬁrm has asked a loan to the bank. The advantage of this aid scheme relies on the fact
that within it the government can use the bank as a ’ﬁlter’ in order to select the projects for
which the subsidy is strictly necessary. This aid scheme is proved to work better the bigger or
the more experienced is the ﬁrm.
The last Chapter, "Does Publicity Aﬀect Competition? Evidence from Discontinuities in
Public Procurement Auctions" (joint with Decio Coviello), is an empirical analysis of the eﬀect of
advertising on tenders for public procurement. There is general consensus in the literature about
the existence of a positive relation between number of bidders and auctioneer’s rent which, in the
context of public procurement auction, is represented by the oﬀered rebate on the price paid by
the contracting authority to the winner for the accomplishment of the works. No consensus exists,
though, on the eﬀect of an increase in the number of potential bidders. Indeed, the larger is the
number of potential participants the lower is the incentive to submit a bid, given the existence of
non-negligible participation costs which makes entry risky. As a consequence, advertising a tender
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(and thus enlarging the number of potential participants) has an ambiguous eﬀect on auction’s
ﬁnal outcome. This result has been proved by Menezes and Monteiro (2000) with a model of
auction with endogenous entry but it has not been tested empirically yet. Using a unique dataset
on public tenders which took place in Tuscany - Italy in the period 2000 - 2006, Chapter 3 tests the
causal eﬀects of publicity by exploiting discontinuities in the Italian law on public procurement
auctions. Indeed, the law identiﬁes groups of auctions on the basis of their starting value. To
each group a diﬀerent level of compulsory advertisement policy which might be local, regional,
national or European, is associated. Chapter 3 thus implements a Regressions Discontinuity
Design (RDD) which allows to compare auctions with similar starting values immediately above
or below each discontinuity threshold separating diﬀerent groups. The empirical analysis reports
evidence of a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of publicity on the number of participants
to auctions and on the winning rebate. Evidence of a negative correlation between competition
and the time to deliver the good put on auction is also reported. Finally, Chapter 3 attempts
to identify the eﬀect of publicity on the composition of bidders and ﬁnds that advertisement
signiﬁcantly raises the probability that the winner of the auction is a ﬁrm which do not belong
to the region where the auction takes place. As coordination with outsiders is more diﬃcult, it
is thus possible that publicity aﬀects the auctioneer’s rent also by decreasing the likelihood of
collusive agreements between the participating ﬁrms.
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1.1 Introduction
In principle, the use of state aid is banned by the Treaty establishing the European Community.
One of the main reasons for the ban lies in the fact that subsidies, altering the relative positions of
competing ﬁrms, usually lead to welfare reducing distortions in the market. The Treaty, however,
allows for a number of exceptions to the general ban whenever the potential distortion of a subsidy
is low enough to be overcome by its potential beneﬁts, such as the support of a depressed area
or the growth of a particular sector of a country’s economy. The purpose of this paper is to
analyze a well-established policy of the European Commission on the compatibility of state aid
with the Treaty’s rules according to which subsidies which lower ﬁrms’ variable cost (VCA )a r e
more distortive than subsidies which lower ﬁrms’ ﬁxed entry cost (FCA). To a certain extent,
the deﬁnition of variable cost aid coincides with what the Commission calls operating state aid
i.e. aid ordinarily associated with business’ normal operations. As an illustration, consider a
recent European competition policy case: the Ryanair - Charleroi case.1 In short, the publicly
controlled airport of Charleroi granted some beneﬁts to the air carrier Ryanair in order to
encourage the opening of new routes to Charleroi. These beneﬁts have been considered state aid
by the Commission, but only some of them have been found to be incompatible with EU rules,
given the exceptional features of the depressed area of Charleroi. The Commission decided that
those beneﬁts which were suﬃciently tied to the start-up of new routes and to the development of
the airport could have been considered compatible with the Treaty of Rome under the provision
of Article 87(3)(c). On the other hand, those aids which were intended to reduce Ryanair’s
variable cost had to be given back, since they did not meet the compatibility criteria established
by the Commission. Examples of the ﬁr s tt y p eo fs u b s i d i e s-t h o s et h a tw e r eﬁnally allowed - are:
160,000 euros per new route opened, up to a maximum amount of 1,920,000 euros; 200 square
meters free of charge to be used for oﬃces and as engineering store; a lump sum contribution
to promotional activities. Examples of the second type of subsidies - those that were banned -
are: a preferential rate for landing charges of 1 euro per boarding passenger, which is about one
half of the oﬃcial standard rate charged to airlines in Belgium; a rate of 1 euro per passenger for
ground-handling services which is about ten times lower than the average rate charged to other
airlines.2
1OJ 2004 L137/1, 12 February 2004
2For reasons which will become clear later (when we will illustrate the basic setting of the model), notice that the
complainer in the Ryanair-Charleroi case is AEA, the Association of European Airlines. Among the 31 members,
only one (Brussels Airline) is Belgian. Notice, moreover, that Ryanair’s competitors in Charleroi are just four (Blue
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Rather than being an isolated case, the Ryanair - Charleroi case decision is a manifestation
of a general approach which has become evident during past years in the Commission’s oﬃcial
documents and decisions. The Commission’s guidelines on national regional aid clearly states
that, in the context of aid to stimulate the development of depressed areas, aid to initial invest-
ment is allowed while aid aimed at reducing a ﬁrm’s current expenses is normally prohibited.3
Nevertheless, as a conﬁrmation that this kind of approach is a general one and that it concerns
aids which do not fall into the regional aid category, it is suﬃcient to have a look at the list
of decisions taken in the past years and to notice that the likelihood of being considered illegal
state aid is much higher for aids which use tax reduction instruments rather than a direct grant
instruments. Think for example of cases such as the Italian tax breaks for companies listed for
the ﬁrst time on the EU stock exchanges, where the motivation for outlawing the aid scheme is
that the subsidy is proportionate to the revenues earned by the beneﬁciaries.4 Or to the case
of three aid schemes implemented by the Basque province, where the Commission states "...as
they [the aid schemes] also constitute operating aid, doubts exist about their compatibility with
the common market". In the words of the Commission, the aid schemes were indeed designed
to relieve ﬁrms of cost tax charges they would normally have to bear as part of their everyday
management of usual activities and are, as a consequence, illegal.5
Our aim is to study whether this approach is consistent with a rigorous competition policy
analysis. Although it is true that state subsidies may introduce distortions in the market, it is
not generally true that banning variable cost subsidies and allowing start-up subsidies is optimal
for a welfare maximizing Competition Authority. Any optimal choice requires consideration of
the trade-oﬀ between the possible gain in welfare due to an increase in competition (which may
be brought by variable cost aids too) and the possible loss of welfare brought by the distortions
introduced in the market. The approach taken by the European Commission on the Ryanair
- Charleroi case and, in general, on state aid seems to lack such a consideration. The model
presented in this paper addresses that concern focusing on the competition policy aspect of state
aid only and leaving aside alternative possible concerns such as lobbying or public choice issues.
The focus is on a speciﬁc kind of aid, that is aid to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and
in the basic setting the two competing ﬁrms are foreigners. Much have been said on state aid to
Air, Jet4you, On Air, Wizz Air). None of them is Belgian.
3Commission’s guidelines on national regional aid, OJ C 74, 10/03/1998 0009-0031
4IP/05/304
5IP/00/1244
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attract FDI (Brander and Spencer [1985], Krugman [1987], Markusen et al. [1995], Markusen and
Venables [1997], Barros and Cabral [2000], Fumagalli [2003]) but these works exhibit signiﬁcant
diﬀerences with the model presented in this paper. Usually the presence of more than one
government competing in order to attract FDI is assumed, local ﬁrms are assumed to play a
role in host markets and the analysis does not include a comparison among diﬀerent possible aid
instruments which could be implemented. In this paper, on the contrary, I abstract from those
features to focus on the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent ways of ﬁnancing foreign direct investments.
Therefore, in the model there is only one government, there are no local producers (the incumbent
is also supposed to be foreign-owned) and externalities are not modelled for simplicity. That is:
the focus is not on what is the reason why the government wants to subsidize entry - spillovers,
labor market imperfections, and so on. The robustness of the model’s results are however tested
when these assumption are relaxed in Section 2.2.
As we shall see, the model outlined in Section 2 suggests that VCAis always preferred to
FCAwhenever the government decides to intervene and both state aid instruments do not cause
the incumbent ﬁrm to exit the market. The conclusion is that a general ban that prevents
governments from using variable cost aid may be welfare detrimental by forcing the government
to adopt a sub-optimal policy.
Although the basic setting of the model is rather stylized, the results of the paper appear to
be robust to generalization. Garcia and Neven [2005] show how the impact of state aid depends
on market concentration: they ﬁnd that the distortions induced by entry of a subsidized ﬁrm tend
to be reduced when competition between domestic ﬁrms is increased. The results of my paper
are shown to be robust to the extension of the game to n playing ﬁrms and to the introduction
of an externality function which links entry to the local economy. The model is extended for the
case in which the incumbent ﬁrm is domestic as well. In that case the government internalizes the
negative eﬀect on the incumbent’s proﬁts due to entry and state aid becomes less likely. Moreover,
the unique kind of aid which is granted at the equilibrium is FCA, because the implicit further
reduction in the incumbent’s proﬁts due to a reduction of the entrant’s marginal cost makes VCA
always inferior to FCAin terms of welfare. This result suggests that the likelihood of a negative
impact of a ban on variable cost aid by the European Commission is reduced whenever domestic
ﬁrms play a signiﬁcant role in the game.
The model’s results have a clear policy implication: a Competition Authority should assess the
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impact of an aid on competition and welfare independently of the way in which it is granted, VCA
or FCA. A decision which depends largely on the kind of state aid instrument used might then
require additional justiﬁcation and should be carefully analyzed. We are aware that contingent
rules are diﬃcult to administer, though. Indeed, the model suggests a rule of thumb which can
be used to select those cases where variable cost aid should be looked at with suspect. These are
those cases where the incumbent ﬁrm is foreigner with respect to the government granting the
aid but domestic with respect to the supranational Competition Authority.
These results may be naturally compared with those few works in the literature where the
authors focus more closely on subsidies and competition in the context of European Union’s
competition policy. Collie [2000, 2002] models a situation where governments subsidize their
own ﬁrms in order to increase their competitiveness and to catch the increasing oligopolistic
proﬁts. He then concludes that the shadow cost of subsidization is crucial in determining whether
prohibiting state aid is welfare enhancing. In the model outlined in this paper the shadow cost
λ of the subsidy has, instead, a secondary impact on the general conclusions. An increase in
λ reduces state intervention’s likelihood and increases the advantage given by granting FCA
rather than VCA . It turns out that the impact of a ban of VCAon welfare is lower since the
government is willing to use VCAin fewer cases. Nevertheless, even taking into consideration
that FCA improves its relative advantage with respect to VCAwhen the entrant is ineﬃcient,
FCAwould never arise for any value of λ in the basic setting i.e. when both the two competing
ﬁrms are foreigners. Thus only VCAcan occur at the equilibrium and the general conclusions
are unaltered.
Besley and Seabright [1999] analyze the role of subsidies in a static and dynamic framework
and suggest a way of using the strategic trade literature to assess the European Union’s approach
to state aid. Nicolaides and Bilal [1999] check the validity of EU rules on state aid in promoting
eﬃciency arguing that aid aimed to correct market failure should be allowed even if they may have
cross-border eﬀects. Compared to these researches, this paper proposes an analytical approach
and a new setting in which to assess the European competition policy on state aid.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section I describe the basic setting, solve
the model and test the robustness of the results obtained through several extensions to the basic
model. In Section 3 I describe the conclusions and discuss the policy implications of the model.
The proofs of the results are illustrated in Appendix A (Appendix B contains the minor proofs
with all the algebraic expressions, which are not reported in the paper for ease of exposition).
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1.2 The Model
The players of the game are: the government G of a representative country, an entrant ﬁrm E
a n da ni n c u m b e n tﬁrm I.A tt h em o m e n tt h eg a m es t a r t s ,E is outside the market and I is inside
the market producing qm
i > 0.F i r m j has constant marginal cost 0 ≤ Cj ≤ 1. In addition, E
has to pay a ﬁxed cost of entry K>0 if it enters the market. Firm j’s net-of-costs proﬁti sπj.
Consumers’ demand is given by:
Q =1− P
where Q = qi + qe is total output produced by the two ﬁrms and P is the associated market
price. The government maximizes total domestic welfare W(Ce,C i,K,λ),w h e r eλ ≥ 1 is the
shadow cost of the subsidy.6 In order to abstract from strategic trade policy (or rent-extraction)
considerations, in this basic setting it is assumed that both I and E are foreign ﬁrms and that
the government maximizes the following welfare function:
W(Ce,C i,K,λ)=CS(Ce,C i) − λS(Ce,C i,K) (1.1)
where CS(Ce,C i) is the consumer surplus and S(Ce,C i,K) is the subsidy.7 As it can be seen, the
welfare function does not explicitly include any positive externalities to the local economy due to
t h ee n t r a n c eo faf o r e i g nﬁrm in the market. This hypothesis is made for the sake of simplicity
and it is discussed in Section 2.2.3.
The focus of the analysis is on the eﬀect of subsidies on the competition between E and I.
For that reason, we can concentrate on the relative instead of the absolute eﬃciency of the two
competing ﬁrms. So, for simplicity, in the rest of the paper it is assumed Ci = 1
2.8
The game has four stages:9
6λ =1when lump-sum taxes are feasible (Collie [2002]). Empirical evidence shows that λ m a yv a r yf r o m1
(Kaplow [1996]) to 2.65 (Feldstein [1997]).
7Notice that the welfare function maximized by the government would be the same if the government adopts a
consumer surplus standard and one of the two or both ﬁrms are domestic.
8Section 2.2.1 relaxes and discusses this assumption in order to check whether the government would ever grant
an aid such that the incumbent ﬁrm is crowded out from the market by the entrant ﬁrm (this can happen only if
Ci >
1
2). Indeed, Mariniello [2006] lets Ci vary and formally shows that if entry forces the incumbent to exit the
market, the government does not grant any subsidy.
9Stage 1 and stage 2 could be brought together by saying that in stage 1 the government chooses the level of
each type of subsidy which can also be zero. That would have no impact on the solution of the game, though.
In the paper stage 1 and 2 are separated because this structure of the game facilitates the analysis.
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1. The government chooses between one of the following actions: ﬁnancing a reduction in the
size of K in order to allow the entrant to enter the market (ﬁxed cost aid, FCA); ﬁnancing
a reduction in Ce (variable cost aid, VCA ) for the same purpose; leaving the entrant’s ﬁxed
and variable cost unchanged (no intervention, NI).
2. The government chooses the amount of subsidy to be provided, if any. Deﬁne Sk as subsidy
to ﬁxed cost and Sc as subsidy to marginal cost. If the government has chosen FCAin the
previous stage, it ﬁxes Sk > 0 and Sc =0 . If it has chosen VCA ,i tﬁxes Sc > 0 and Sk =0 .
If the government has chosen NI in the ﬁr s ts t a g e ,i ts e t sSk = Sc =0 .
3. After observing the government’s decision, the entrant E chooses whether to enter the
market or not.
4. Firms in the market compete àl aC o u r n o tsetting the output levels qj.
The aim of the model is to outline situations where an entrant ﬁrm intends to enter the market
but does not choose to do so because the presence of an entry barrier proxied by the ﬁxed cost
K makes entry unproﬁtable. To focus on the interesting case where entry does not occur absent
state aid, we need to impose the following restrictions R on the cost parameters:
R1The ﬁxed cost barrier is suﬃcient to deter entry
First, we require that E is not eﬃcient enough to overcome by itself the entry barrier, otherwise
there would be no need for subsidization. In other words, a suﬃciently large subsidy is strictly
needed by E in order to proﬁtably enter the market.
R2The ﬁxed cost barrier is necessary to deter entry
Second, we require that, absent entry barriers, the two ﬁrms are able to coexist in the market.
Suppose that this was not the case i.e. that the market sustains only one ﬁrm. Then the
comparison between FCA and VCAis pointless: both the two aid instruments would force the
incumbent out if eﬀective in making the entrant enter the market. Then, regardless of the type of
aid instrument implemented, competition would be distorted by an eﬀective subsidy. This case
is of marginal interest for the analysis proposed.
R3VCA can be eﬀective in triggering entry
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Third, we assume that the government cannot turn a cost into a beneﬁta n dw er e q u i r et h a t
the maximum variable cost subsidy that can be granted (i.e. Sc = Ce) is enough to let the
entrant enter the market and produce a positive quantity. If that was not the case, there would
be no reason to compare FCA with VCA , because the only state aid instrument that could be
implemented by the government would be FCA.
Restrictions R1 - R3 are formally summarized in the following table:
formulation restriction






qe > 0 if K =0




R3 qe > 0 if Ce =0 K<1
4
To understand how each restriction is formally expressed, it is suﬃc i e n tt on o t i c et h a ti nt h e
last stage of the game ﬁrm j chooses qj =
1+Cl6=j−2Cj







1.2.1 The solution of the basic model
Let us solve the game by backward induction:
Stage 4: ﬁrms’ output choice
In this stage ﬁrms in the market compete àl aC o u r n o tand decide how much to produce.















If the entrant did not enter the market in the previous stage then quantities and price are:
qo
e =0 ,q o
i = Qo = 1
4,P o = 3
4 (1.3)
Notice that Po >Pand Qo <Q∀ Ce.
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Stage 3: the decision of the entrant
Firm E decides to enter the market whenever it obtains non negative proﬁts, i.e. whenever:
πe(Ce,K,S c,S k)=
¡3
2 − 2(Ce − Sc)
¢2
9
− (K − Sk) ≥ 0
Stage 2: the government chooses the subsidy levels
In stage two the government sets Sk and Sc in order to achieve the highest possible level of
welfare, given the method chosen (FCA, VCA , NI) in stage 1. To this aim it proves helpful to
deﬁne the threshold values K(Ce) and Ce(K) which are those values for K and Ce at which by













If the government is adopting FCA then it has to set Sk s.t. the new entry barrier faced by
the entrant K − Sk is below or equal to K. On the other hand, if the government is adopting
VCA ,t h e ni th a st os e tSc s.t. the new marginal cost of the entrant Ce−Sc is lower than or equal
to Ce. In the following the optimal choice of Sk and Sc made by the government is analyzed.
The optimal choice of Sk when FCAhas been chosen If the government has chosen FCA




s.t. K − Sk ≤ K
where Wk(Ce,S k,λ): =CSk(Ce) − λSk is the welfare function when adopting FCA.N o t s u r -
prisingly, the unique solution for the maximization problem is S∗
k = K− K i.e. it is such that E
breaks even. The government has no incentive to set K−Sk < K because this does not entail any
beneﬁcial eﬀects. It would increase the cost of the subsidy keeping constant the gain in consumer
surplus associated with entry.
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The optimal choice of Sc when VCA has been chosen When VCAhas been chosen in




s.t. Ce − Sc ≤ Ce
where Wc(Ce,S c,λ): =CSc(Ce,S c) − λqe(Ce,S c)Sc is the welfare function when adopting VCA .
The solutions are illustrated by the following lemma:
Lemma 1.1 If VCAis chosen by the government, then two cases may arise: (i) If the entrant
is relatively ineﬃcient (Ce > c Ce(K,λ)), the optimal subsidy level S∗
c is the one that makes the
entrant to break even (S∗
c = Ce − Ce(K)). (ii) If, instead, the entrant is relatively eﬃcient
(Ce ≤ c Ce(K,λ)), the optimal subsidy level S∗
c is higher than what is strictly needed by the entrant
to enter the market (S∗
c ≥ Ce − Ce(K)).
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the ﬁr s tc a s et h ee n t r a n ti si n e ﬃcient with respect to the entry barrier. That is: because
of a high entry barrier or of an ineﬃcient entrant, facilitating entry is costly. In that case the
government limits its intervention to the least subsidy capable to trigger entry. On the other
hand, if triggering entry is relatively cheap because K or Ce are low enough, the optimal subsidy
reduces the marginal cost of the entrant more than what it is needed to enter the market. Indeed,
when subsidizing entry is cheap, the gain in consumer surplus due to a reduction of the entrant’s
marginal cost oﬀsets the relatively low additional cost represented by a greater subsidy. In
this case the entrant enters the market and makes positive proﬁts, while in the former case it
just breaks even. Notice that the threshold value c Ce(K,λ) is decreasing in the shadow cost of







the more costly is rising funds to ﬁnance state aid the less likely is that subsidization is used
by the government as an instrument to increase consumer surplus through a reduction of the
marginal costs of those ﬁrms that would anyhow enter the market.
It is interesting to notice, moreover, that, since restrictions R1 and R2 deﬁnes an upper and a
lower bound for Ce, they implicitly identify the intervals of values of the entry cost K for which
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just one of the two mentioned variable cost aid types may arise:
K< 1
4(12λ−1)2 =⇒ S∗
c >C e − Ce
1
4(12λ−1)2 ≤ K ≤ 1
4(6λ−1)2 =⇒ S∗
c ≥ Ce − Ce
K> 1
4(6λ−1)2 =⇒ S∗
c = Ce − Ce
Since Ce cannot be bigger than 3
4,i fK is very small, it is always the case that Ce < c Ce(K,λ)
and the optimal subsidy is such that S∗





K,f o rs u ﬃciently high values of K it is always the case that Ce > c Ce(K,λ) and the
subsidy is such that S∗
c = Ce − Ce(K). For intermediate values of K, both cases arise.
Stage 1: the government chooses among diﬀerent types of aid
In the ﬁrst stage of the game the government compares each possible action and then chooses the
one which is associated with the highest level of welfare. Given the optimal choices of the subsidy
in stage two, the welfare yielded by NI, FCAand VCAare W∗
o, W∗
k and W∗
c respectively, as it


























with Ce ≤ c Ce(K,λ)
W∗

















with Ce > c Ce(K,λ)
Let us compare the three options two-by-two:
• VCA vs FCA
First, let us compare VCA with FCA. We need to consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case
the entrant is eﬃcient (Ce ≤ c Ce(K,λ)) and S∗
c is such that the entrant makes positive proﬁts.
Appendix A (proof. 1) shows that in this case VCAis always preferred to FCA. To understand
the intuition for that result, consider the limit case where the entrant is almost eﬃcient enough
to overcome by herself the entry barrier and Ce ≤ c Ce(K,λ). In that case, if the government
chooses to grant VCAsuch that the entrant breaks even, FCAand VCAare equivalent: at the
limit costs are zero and the eﬀect on consumer surplus is the same. However, from Lemma 1.1
we know that if the entrant is very eﬃcient the government prefers to grant a bigger subsidy if
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using VCA .S o VCAallows the government to reach a higher level of welfare with respect to
FCAif the entrant is eﬃcient enough to make the government willing to grant her an additional
aid with respect to what is strictly needed to trigger entry.
In the second case, instead, the entrant is ineﬃcient (Ce > c Ce(K,λ)) and the government
grants an aid such that she breaks even (S∗
c = Ce − Ce). To study this case, it proves useful
to split the analysis in two parts in order to understand how the two eﬀects, gain in consumer
surplus and loss in public resources, inﬂuence the government’s choice.
Let us discuss the impact on consumer surplus, ﬁrst. It turns out that the gain in consumer
















by Ce − S∗
c <C e. The intuition for that result is simple: while FCA raises consumer surplus
only through competition, VCAhas the same eﬀect plus an additional positive eﬀect given by the
increase in the eﬃciency of one of the two ﬁrms competing in the market. The two aid instruments
h a v et h es a m ee ﬀect on consumer surplus only at the limit when E is eﬃcient enough to overcome
by herself the entry barrier (a case which is excluded by R1). Let us move now to the loss in
public resources due to the subsidy. In this case the analysis is less straightforward. It turns out
that when the entrant is relatively ineﬃcient, VCAcosts more than FCA. Figure 1 represents
the two aids’ cost curves as a function of Ce (the algebraic expressions are reported in Appendix
B).10
insert figure 1
As ﬁgure 1 shows, the cost of providing VCAis linear and increasing in Ce while the cost of
providing FCAis concave in Ce: as the entrant becomes relatively less eﬃcient (Ce increases) both
10An interesting issue to be considered is the existence of government’s budget constraints. It is possible, indeed,
that a domestic government is not able to implement a welfare improving subsidy because the amount of resources
needed is greater than the amount of resources available to the agency in charge to grant the aid. In that case, the
government may be forced to use the aid instrument which costs less, even if implementing an other aid instrument









4 ) and the budget
constraint BC is lower than λqeS
∗
c (which is the least amount of resources needed to implement VCA ). Moreover,
Appendix B shows that whenever VCAand FCAhave the same cost, VCAis preferred to FCA.
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the two aid instruments cost more, but while the cost of granting VCAincreases at a constant
rate, the cost of granting FCA is marginally decreasing. Hence the bigger is Ce the higher is
the diﬀerence between the two cost functions. The intuition for that result is the following:
when VCAis granted, the quantity produced by the ﬁrm once it is in the market is always the
same, whatever is the original marginal cost of the entrant. Indeed, when Ce > c Ce(K,λ),t h e
government chooses S∗
c such that Ce − S∗
c = Ce(K). For that reason, the post-entry amount
of quantity produced qe(Ce) remains constant and equal to qe(Ce(K)) whatever is the original
degree of eﬃciency of the entrant. It turns out that an increase of an ε>0 in Ce is translated
in an equivalent increase of ε in the cost of subsidization with VCA . On the other hand, if the
government implements FCA,a ni n c r e a s ei nCe (which now remains unaltered after the subsidy
is granted) obviously determines an increase in the cost of the aid because the proﬁts earned by
E are reduced and the gap between E’s proﬁts and the entry cost which must be oﬀset by the
subsidy is consequently increased. However, the negative eﬀect of a marginal increase in Ce on
E’s proﬁts is smaller the bigger is Ce,g i v e nﬁrms’ quadratic proﬁt function. So the marginal cost
of granting FCAis decreasing in Ce.
In short, granting VCA to an ineﬃcient entrant is costly if compared to granting FCA,
because with VCAthe ﬁrm that receives the subsidy does not incorporate her eﬃciency level in
her production choices, while with FCAshe does.
Notice that, for ease of exposition, the analysis just illustrated uses Ce as a proxy of the
relative ineﬃciency of the entrant with respect to the entry barrier, which is held constant. We
could nevertheless use K for the same purposes: holding Ce constant, an increase in K reduces
the relative eﬃciency of the entrant as well, and the result explained above would not change: as
K increases, VCAbecomes relatively more expensive with respect to FCA.11
We can thus identify those values of K such that VCAis preferred to FCA. Indeed, the
government chooses VCAinstead of FCAif (and only if):
K ≤
(3(8λ +3 )− 4Ce(8λ +1 ) ) 2
36(4λ − 1)2 = ψ(Ce,λ) (1.6)
11Notice though that if we let the subsidy cost depends only on K and hold Ce constant, the cost functions of
the two aid instruments have diﬀerent shape: now the FCA’s cost function is linear in K and the VCA ’s cost
function is convex in K: indeed, an increase in K needs to be oﬀset either by an equal increase in the lump-sum
subsidy (if FCA) either with a marginally increasing reduction in Ce (if VCA ), given ﬁrms’ convex proﬁt function.
The result illustrated holding K constant thus does not change.
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which means that an increase in the shadow cost of subsidy reduces VCA ’s comparative advantage
with respect to FCA. The explanation is rather straightforward: we have seen that when the
entrant is ineﬃcient, an increase in its marginal cost determines an increase in the (positive)
diﬀerence between VCA ’s and FCA’s granting costs. An increase in λ then magniﬁes the relative
burden that choosing VCAentails with respect to choosing FCA.
• FCA vs NI
The welfare yielded by NI is simply the consumer surplus when only the incumbent is in the
market. The diﬀerence with the welfare yielded by FCAis then made up of two opposite eﬀects:
a gain in the consumer surplus due to an increase in competition in the market, and a loss in
terms of the public resources needed to ﬁnance the aid.12 The lower is the entry barrier, the
c h e a p e rt ot r i g g e re n t r y ,t h em o r el i k e l yt h ef o r m e re ﬀect dominates. Indeed, solving for K we
get that the government prefers FCAto NI if (and only if):
K ≤
16C2
e(8λ +1 )− 48Ce(4λ +1 )+9 ( 8 λ +3 )
288λ
= σ(Ce,λ) (1.7)
The threshold σ(Ce,λ) is decreasing in λ and Ce in the interval deﬁned by restrictions R2 (i.e.
whenever 0 <C e < 3
4): the less eﬃcient the entrant, the lower is the gain in consumer surplus
and the more costly to pull down the entry barrier. Hence, the less likely that FCAis preferred
to NI. Similarly, a greater λ implies an higher burden on public resources and the subsidy is less
beneﬁcial for welfare.
This result combined with the one reported above, leads us to achieve a ﬁrst important
conclusion concerning the equilibrium. Appendix A (proof. 2) shows that ψ(Ce,λ) is always
greater than σ(Ce,λ) for any feasible value of λ. This implies the following proposition:
Proposition 1.1 whenever FCA is preferred to VCA , NI is preferred to FCA.H e n c e FCA
never arises at the equilibrium.
12Notice that when a subsidy is granted the gain in consumer surplus is always non-negative: since CSk(Ce) is
decreasing in Ce, to show that CSk(Ce) ≥ CSo it is suﬃcient to set Ce at its maximum value Ce =
3
4 and notice
that at that value CSk(
3
4)=CSo.
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Proof. See Appendix A (proof. 2).
The intuition behind this result is the following: for FCAto be preferred to VCAwhen the
entrant is ineﬃcient (Ce > c Ce(K,λ)) it is necessary that the entry barrier is relatively big. In
that case, however, ﬁnancing entry is too costly if compared to the beneﬁts obtained in terms of
consumer surplus. It is thus preferable not to intervene at all instead of granting FCA. Hence
FCAcannot arise at the equilibrium.13
• VCA vs NI
Now let us compare the welfare yielded by VCAwith the welfare yielded by NI.A si nt h e
ﬁrst comparison studied, two diﬀerent cases arise. In the ﬁrst one the government grants a VCA
higher than what is strictly needed to let E enter the market (i.e. Ce ≤ c Ce(K,λ)). In that case,
it always prefers VCAto NI:i fCe is so low that S∗
c is higher than the threshold level, then entry
is very cheap and the gain in terms of consumer surplus due to VCAalways oﬀset its cost.14
Instead, when E is suﬃciently ineﬃcient so that the government chooses a subsidy such that







where the threshold τ(Ce,λ) is decreasing in Ce and λ. The intuition for this result is similar to
the one illustrated for the previous case.
Appendix A shows that the threshold τ(Ce,λ) is always smaller than the threshold ψ(Ce,λ)
(proof 2) and greater than the threshold σ(Ce,λ) (proof 4).
Imagine, by contradiction, that τ(Ce,λ) >ψ (Ce,λ): that would mean that there exists an
interval of values of the entry barrier (ψ(Ce,λ) <K<τ (Ce,λ)) such that FCA is preferred to
VCAand NI is preferred to FCA, since we know the threshold which identiﬁes the values of K for
which NI is preferred to FCA, σ(Ce,λ), is lower than ψ(Ce,λ).H o w e v e r ,w h e nK<τ (Ce,λ),
VCA is preferred to NI, and this case is ruled out by transitivity i.e. FCA Â VCA and
NI Â FCA=⇒ VCA¨ NI.
Similarly, imagine that σ(Ce,λ) >τ (Ce,λ). That would mean that there exists an interval
of values of the entry barrier K where NI is preferred to VCA(when K is bigger than τ(Ce,λ))
and where FCA is preferred to NI (when K is smaller than σ(Ce,λ)). But since σ(Ce,λ) <
13This result is as well illustrated graphically in ﬁgure 3-4 below.
14See Appendix A (proof 3) for a formal proof.
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ψ(Ce,λ),i nt h es a m ei n t e r v a lVCAshould be preferred to FCA, and this case is ruled out for a
reason similar to the one illustrated above: NI Â VCAand FCAÂ NI =⇒ VCA¨ FCA.
insert figures 2,3,4
Figure 2-4 illustrate graphically these results. Figure 2 represents the three thresholds identi-
ﬁed and the relative government’s choice in stage 1. Figures 3 and 4 describe the welfare functions
correspondent to the three possible choices of the government in stage 1 with two diﬀerent values
of λ: as anticipated above, an increase in the shadow cost of subsidy decreases the comparative
advantage of VCAwith respect to FCA but it is still not suﬃcient to let FCA occur at the
equilibrium.
It turns out that the only two options which might occur at the equilibrium are VCA ,i fK
or Ce are small enough, or NI i nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s e :
if either Ce ≤ c Ce(K,λ) or K ≤ τ(Ce,λ) then the government0sc h o i c ei sVC A
if Ce > c Ce(K,λ) and K > τ(Ce,λ) then the government0sc h o i c ei sN I
It is easy to check, moreover, that Ce ≤ c Ce(K,λ)= ⇒ K ≤ τ(Ce,λ).15 In other words, there
cannot exist an interval of values where Ce ≤ c Ce(K,λ) and K>τ (Ce,λ). So the condition for
Ce is redundant, and we can thus simplify the equilibrium result as in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2 If K ≤ τ(Ce,λ) then the government chooses to adopt VCA ,i fK>τ (Ce,λ)
the government chooses not to subsidize the entrant ﬁrm.
Proof. It follows directly from (1.8) and Proposition 1.1.
Since at equilibrium the government never chooses to grant FCA, the model may appear to
be in contrast with the Ryanair - Charleroi’s facts or with all the other cases in which both kinds
of aid were granted. This result however depends on the no mix-form aid assumption: if the
government in the model is allowed to lower both K and Ce a tt h es a m et i m et h e nb o t hFCA
and VCAcan occur at the equilibrium.16 Another possible explanation for observing FCA is
15Recall τ(Ce,λ) is decreasing in Ce and notice that τ(f Ce,λ)=4 K>K .
16If we allow for mixed forms of aid in the model, the conclusions are unaltered. Indeed, the pure form aid choices
are a subset of the mix form aid choices (if the government can use mix form aid, it can always set FCA=0and
replicate the no mix form case solution). Thus welfare can only increase if the government is allowed to use both
FCAand VCAat the same time.
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simply that the government may anticipate that the likelihood of a negative decision from the
European Commission is higher when VCAis implemented. Indeed, there exists an interval of
values for the parameters where if the government cannot grant a VCAit grants a FCA,a d o p t i n g
a sub-optimal decision. Finally, a third explanation is that the government is not able to choose
the optimal aid instrument because it is rationally bounded or because its choices are limited by
some budget constraints (see footnote 10).
1.2.2 Extensions
In the following I will illustrate four possible extensions to the basic model and check the robust-
ness of the results obtained above. Here I will report only an informal explanation. The reader
interested in the formal treatment may refer to Mariniello [2006].
Crowding out is possible
If we let Ci  (0,1) then crowding out becomes feasible. Indeed, by letting the entrant enter the
market, the government can indirectly cause the incumbent ﬁrm to exit the market, because
VCAcan bring the entrant’s marginal cost so low such that the incumbent is not able to sustain
competition anymore. It is possible to show, though, that this never happens at the equilibrium:
the gain in the consumer surplus (net of subsidy cost) brought by VCAwhen the incumbent ﬁrm
exits the market is never higher than the gain in consumer surplus (net of subsidy cost) brought by
FCA. The formal proof follows two steps: ﬁrst, it is possible to show that when the government
can trigger entry with VCAwithout causing the crowding out eﬀect (i.e. Ci is low enough such
that Ce = Ce(K,Ci) ; qi(Ce,C i) < 0) it never grants a subsidy such that I is forced out (i.e.
it does not grant VCA which is higher than what is needed to pull down the entry barrier).
Second, it can be shown that if Ci is so high that triggering entry with VCAnecessarily causes
the incumbent to be crowded out from the market (Ce = Ce(K,Ci) ⇒ qi(Ce,C i) < 0) , then FCA
is always preferable to VCA . This result is rather intuitive: if E is already eﬃcient, then FCAis
surely better, because consumer surplus is higher when two ﬁrms are in the market. If, instead,
both E and I are ineﬃcient, substituting an ineﬃcient incumbent with an eﬃcient entrant by
granting VCAcan yield a higher level of consumer surplus with respect to the case of competition
between two ineﬃcient ﬁrms, but the cost that should be sustained by the government to trigger
entry is so high that still FCAwould be preferable.
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We can conclude that a rational government does not use VCAwhen this aid instrument is
capable to force exit of incumbent ﬁrms.
More than one incumbent ﬁrm
Since the marginal gain in consumer surplus associated with entry is expected to be lower when
more than two ﬁrms are playing the game, the results that have been shown above might be
expected to change if we increase the number of playing ﬁrms. This is not the case, though.
Let us suppose that in the domestic market (n − 1) > 1 symmetric ﬁrms are operating
producing qi > 0 and making positive proﬁts. Their marginal cost is c = 1
2. Restrictions R1-R3
of the basic model are then modiﬁed accordingly:
formulation restriction






qe > 0 if K =0




R3 qe > 0 if Ce =0 K<1
4
Solving the game by backward induction as we did in the basic setting, we obtain a generalization
of Proposition 1.2:
Proposition 1.3 when n ﬁrms are playing the game, if K ≤ τn(Ce,λ,n) then the government
chooses to adopt VCA ,i fK>τ n(Ce,λ,n) the government chooses not to subsidize the entrant
ﬁrm. FCA never arises at the equilibrium.
Proof. Appendix A (proofs 5 - 8) generalize the results needed to prove Proposition 1.2 and
hence prove Proposition 1.3.
The result of the basic setting are then robust to the generalization to n ﬁrms. Appendix A
(proof 9) moreover shows that
∂τn(Ce,λ,n)
∂n < 0: when the number of incumbents increases, the
condition for subsidization becomes stricter (i.e. state aid is less likely). This happens because
the marginal positive eﬀect of entry on consumer surplus is reduced and the amount of public
resources needed to trigger entry is increased as n becomes larger. Nevertheless, restrictions R1
and R2 are ’elastic’ with respect to n: they become less strict when n is larger. It turns out that
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the lower bound for Ce is decreasing in n:t h e r ea l w a y sc a nb ea ne n t r a n tﬁrm which is so eﬃcient
with respect to the entry barrier such that VCAis the optimal choice of the government.
Externality associated with entry
The basic model adopts a welfare function in which the local economy is not included. However,
when subsidies to attract FDI are granted, a positive spillover eﬀect to other local markets due
to entry is usually proposed as the main justiﬁcation for subsidization. For example, in the
Ryanair - Charleroi case, Ryanair and the Walloon government claimed that, opening new routes
to Charleroi, Ryanair contributed to the growth of the Walloon’s region through an increase in
the activities of markets complementary to airport’s services such as public transports, hotels,
restaurants and so forth.
Including an externality to the domestic economy in the objective function of the government
does not undermine the main result of the basic model, though. Indeed, the presence of a spillover
correlated with the amount of quantity produced in the market strengthens the validity of the
results, since VCAwould be even more welfare enhancing: the total quantity produced in the
market is increased when the marginal cost of the entrant is reduced.
Domestic incumbent
The basic model assumes that both the incumbent and the entrant are foreign ﬁrms: we might
then wonder whether playing the game with a domestic incumbent would change the results
illustrated above. If the incumbent is domestic, his proﬁts enters the objective function of the
government, which now becomes:
W(Ce,K,λ)=CS(Ce)+πi(Ce) − λS(Ce,K)
where πi are the incumbent’s proﬁts. Solving the game by backward induction, we achieve a ﬁrst
result which contrasts with that reached with the basic model:
Lemma 1.2 If the incumbent is domestic, the government always chooses a subsidy level such
that the entrant breaks even.
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Proof. It follows directly from the solution of the optimization problem.
Lemma 1.2 tells us that even if the entrant is very eﬃcient, the optimal level of subsidy
S∗
c when VCA has been chosen is such that S∗
c = Ce − Ce(K). Contrary to what happens
when the incumbent is foreign, the government internalizes the negative eﬀect that Sc has on
the domestic incumbent’s proﬁts by reducing its competitor’s marginal cost and prefers to choose
the minimum level of Sc capable to trigger entry. In addition, it is possible to show that the
government never chooses VCAin stage 1: when the incumbent is domestic, in fact, subsidy is
very unlikely because the gain in consumer surplus due to an increase in competition unlikely
oﬀsets the loss in incumbent’s proﬁts and the loss in public resources needed to trigger entry.
If that happens, however, then FCA is better than VCAfor the reasons just illustrated: the
government prefers not to lower E’s marginal cost in order to not lower too much I’s proﬁts.
These results can be summarized as it follows:
Proposition 1.4 If the entrant is ineﬃcient enough, then at the equilibrium subsidy does not
occur regardless of the size of the entry barrier.
Proof. See Appendix A (proof. 10).
Proposition 1.5 if K ≤ σd(Ce,λ) then the government chooses to adopt FCA,i fK>σ d(Ce,λ)
the government chooses not to subsidize the entrant ﬁrm. VCAnever arises at the equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A (proof. 11).
1.2.3 The European Commission’s approach
insert figures 5,6
In this section of the paper I discuss the implication of the model for the European Com-
mission’s approach to state aid. Solving the basic model we have seen that for suﬃciently low
values of K and Ce,g r a n t i n gaVCAto an entrant ﬁrm is an optimal policy for a government
maximizing domestic welfare. It turns out that a speciﬁc competition policy which allows FCA
but bans VCA may lead to sub-optimal equilibria where domestic welfare is not maximized.
Figures 5 and 6 report the government’s optimal choice for given variable cost parameters (the
second-best choices when VCAcannot be chosen are in brackets). Figure 5 shows the equilibrium
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government’s choices when VCAis allowed while ﬁgure 6 shows the government’s choices when
VCAis banned. As expected, in both ﬁgures the greater are Ce and K, the wider is the area
of no-intervention. Notice that, if the European Commission allows VCA , the entrant enters
the market with the government’s help for the set of combinations for Ce and K which pick out
points below τ(Ce,K). On the contrary, when VCAis not allowed, only those points lying below
σ(Ce,K) lead to equilibria where two ﬁrms compete in the domestic market.17
How detrimental to domestic welfare can the European Commission’s policy be? As a limit




the welfare yielded by FCAis equal to that obtained without granting any subsidy) and that Ce
is very close to its lowest feasible value given the previous conditions (this in turn means that









c =0 .06432 ≈ 2 × W∗
k.
Diﬀerently stated, allowing the government to grant VCAdoubles domestic welfare. Alterna-
tively, one could say that if the European Commission bans VCA it might generate a loss of
potential gain in welfare of up to 100%. On the other hand, if we let the incumbent ﬁrm be
domestic rather than foreign, the ban of VCAhas no eﬀect on domestic welfare, since we know
from Proposition 1.5 that in this case VCAis never chosen by the government (why would a
government subsidies entry of foreign ﬁrms which displace domestic ones?).
It is now natural to ask whether the European Commission should or should not ban VCA .
Answering that question requires taking into account two factors: the competing ﬁrms’ nationality
and the objective function maximized by the European Commission, WEU. If both the incumbent
17Recall that Appendix A (proof 1) shows that τ(Ce,λ) − σ(Ce,λ) is greater than zero and the interval is never
empty.
18It is easy to see that at these conditions the the gain in welfare yielded by VCAwith respect to the other two
options is maximized.
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and the entrant do not belong to the European Union then the answer is straightforward: VCA
should not be banned. Indeed, in that case the objective function of the European Commission
coincides with that of the Member State which is granting the subsidy: WEU = W = CS − λ.
On the other hand, if the incumbent or both the two ﬁr m sb e l o n gt ot h eE u r o p e a nU n i o n ,
then the answer depends on what is the objective function of the European Commission. If the
Commission maximizes consumer surplus only, then VCAshould not be prohibited, for the same
reason illustrated above (even if the competing ﬁrms are European, their proﬁts do not enter
WEU).
If, on the contrary, the Commission maximizes total welfare, then prohibiting VCAcan be an
optimal policy, because the Member State and the Commission have diﬀerent objective function
(and hence rank the available aid instruments diﬀerently). Indeed, suppose that the incumbent
originates from a Member State which is not the one in charge to grant the aid: then its proﬁts
are not included in the objective function of the government in our model, because the ﬁrm is
foreigner with respect to it (W = CS − λS). However, the incumbent’s proﬁts contribute to the
European Union’s welfare (WEU = CS + πI − λS)a n dt h eu s eo fVCAwould be detrimental
from the European Commission’s perspective, as it follows from Proposition 1.5.19
The analysis just illustrated can then be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1.6 (i) If the European Commission adopts a consumer welfare standard, banning
VCAis a sub-optimal policy. (ii) If the European Commission adopts a total welfare standard,
prohibiting VCAis sub-optimal if the competing ﬁrms do not belong to the European Union.
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 2.
Proposition 1.7 Prohibiting VCAis an optimal policy if (and only if) the European Commis-
sion adopts a total welfare standard and the incumbent ﬁrm originates from a Member State which
is not the one granting the aid.
19Notice that, limit case aside, E enters the market making zero proﬁts, because the aid is such that it breaks
even (see Lemma 1). So πE does not inﬂuence W
EU even if E belongs to the European Union. If, instead, E
is so eﬃcient that VCAi sg r a n t e di naw a ys u c ht h a ti t sp r o ﬁts are positive, then the objective function of the
European Union is W
EU = CS+πI +πE−λCS. VCAshould still be prohibited, though, because the contribution
to welfare due to the entrant’s proﬁts is lower than the loss in incumbent’s proﬁts due to VCA . Appendix A (proof
12) proves this result.
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Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 5 and Appendix A (proof 12).
Proposition 1.6(i) may have relevant implications. Many experts report of an increasing
weight attributed by Antitrust Authorities to consumers’ welfare rather than to total welfare:
for Schmalensee [2004] the beneﬁts of entry are usually assessed by the U.S. Antitrust Authority
solely on the basis of its impact on consumers’ welfare; Derek Morris, former chairman of the
Competition Commission in the U.K., stated that "...in practice, competition policy eﬀectively
gives a very high weighting to consumer welfare and a very low weighting elsewhere"20. Neelie
Kroes, the European Commissioner for Competition Policy, stated very recently: "The consumer
is at the heart of competition enforcement. [...] we are applying this ’consumer welfare standard’
through better use of economic analysis in our work"21. And although many economists are still
reluctant to suggest the use of a consumers’ welfare standard in competition policy analysis,22
there is a growing literature on mergers, which tends to emphasize the beneﬁts of a consumers’
welfare approach with respect to a total welfare approach (see, for example, Lyons [2002] and
Neven and Roller [2005]). It turns out that Proposition 1.6 can have a broad impact on compe-
tition policy analysis of state aid, even if the competing ﬁrms belong to the European Union.
1.3 Conclusions
This paper addresses the economic grounds of the European Commission’s approach to state aid
to attract foreign investment. In particular, it sheds light on a well-established policy of the
Commission according to which state aid aimed to reduce variable cost of production (VCAor
operating aid, in the terminology used by the Commission) is more distortive than state aid aimed
to reduce ﬁxed cost of entry (FCAor start-up aid).
In the basic setting of the model, two foreign ﬁrms are playing the game: one incumbent ﬁrm
already present in the domestic market and one entrant ﬁrm which is unable to enter the market
without the help of the domestic government.
The model allows us to reach the following conclusions: if the minimum VCAnecessary to
make the entrant break even and enter the market does not cause the incumbent ﬁrm to exit the
market, then the only type of aid which can occur at the equilibrium is VCA . This conclusion
20Lecture of the national consumer council, 30 April 2002.
21European Press Releases, http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/691
&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
22For an overview on welfare standards used in competition policy economics, see Motta [2004], pgg. 20-22.
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holds independently of the amount of resources wasted in order to implement the subsidy. In
other words whatever is the shadow cost of subsidy, VCA is always better than FCA,i ft h e
government is willing to grant a subsidy. This result thus diﬀers with the recent literature on
state aid in which the shadow cost of subsidy plays a determinant role (see, for example, Besley
and Seabright [1999] or Collie [2000, 2002]).
On the other hand, if the minimum amount of VCAnecessary to let the entrant enter the
market is suﬃcient to force the incumbent out, then VCAis never granted by the government.
In other words, a rational government never grants an aid such to give to the more eﬃcient
aid-endowed entrant ﬁrm the ability to crowd her competitor out from the market.
The same results are obtained when the basic setti n gi se x t e n d e di no r d e rt oa l l o wf o rp o s i t i v e
externalities in the domestic economy given by FDI and for a number n of ﬁrms playing the
game. In the latter case, an increase in the number of incumbents decreases state aid’s likelihood,
since the marginal contribution of entry to consumer surplus is reduced. Whatever is the number
of playing ﬁrms, however, VCAcan always occur at the equilibrium.
The results mentioned above are not robust to the case of domestic (instead of foreign)
incumbent ﬁrm, though. If the objective function of the government includes incumbent’s proﬁts,
then two results are obtained: ﬁrst, the government is much less likely to subsidize entry. Second,
VCAnever occurs and the only type of aid which can occur at the equilibrium is FCA.T h e
reason why this happens is rather obvious: by including the incumbent’s proﬁts in its objective
function, the government internalizes the negative eﬀect of entry on the domestic competitor.
The model shows that this negative eﬀect is not oﬀset by the potential gain in consumer surplus
of a more eﬃcient entrant, thus identifying FCAa st h eu n i q u et y p eo fa i di n s t r u m e n tw h i c hc a n
be chosen by the government, when deﬁnite conditions for the parameters hold.
Given these ﬁndings, the model shows that a general ban of VCAis unlikely to be an optimal
policy. The main policy implications of the model are expressed in Proposition 1.6 and Proposition
1.7: the European Commission should not prevent governments to use VCAif the competing ﬁrms
do not belong to the European Union or if the Commission adopts a consumer surplus standard;
the unique case in which prohibiting VCAis welfare enhancing is identiﬁed by Proposition 1.7
and it occurs only when the incumbent ﬁrm originates from a Member State which is not the one
granting the aid.
A more general implication of the model is that an Antitrust Authority should not apply a
general a priori rule that discriminates between operative aid and start-up aid. More precisely,
Mariniello, Mario (2008), Competition and the Role of Public Authorities 
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/138651.3. CONCLUSIONS 25
the model casts doubts about the validity of the ’state aid instrument’ argument supporting
a Commission’s decision. There might be several reasons why a VCAshould not be allowed:
bounded rationality of the government or lobbying are examples. But the mere fact of using one
state aid instrument instead of another should not be a discriminant for accepting or rejecting
the state aid programme: further economic analysis is needed in order for such Commission’s
decisions to be fully legitimated. In other words, the model suggests a rule of reason rather than
a per se rule of prohibition for variable cost aid. It could be of interest, for example, to address
the same issue from a political economy point of view and try to account for lobbying issues which
might be one of the main reasons underlying the European Commission’s worries for VCA .I
plan to address that issue in a new research project.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Proofs
Proof n. 1. We need to show that W∗
h c (Ce,λ) ≥ W∗
k(Ce,K,λ) whenever S∗
c ≥ Ce − Ce(K).T o
that purpose, notice that W∗
h c (Ce,λ) ≥ W∗
k(Ce,K,λ) if (and only if):
K ≥
4C2
e(60λ2 +4 λ − 1) − 12Ce(30λ2 +5 λ − 1) + 9(15λ2 +4 λ − 1)
72λ(12λ − 1)
= φ(Ce,λ)















h c (Ce,λ) ≥ W∗
k(Ce,K,λ) i.e. when the government grants a subsidy greater than what is
strictly necessary, VCAis always preferred to FCA.
Proof n. 2. We need to show that ψ(Ce,λ) >σ (Ce,λ).P r o o f4s h o w st h a tσ(Ce,λ) is always





(see below). In order to show that ψ(Ce,λ)
>σ (Ce,λ) it is then suﬃcient to show that ψ(Ce,λ) >τ (Ce,λ) >σ (Ce,λ).
By R2:
(3(8λ +3 )− 4Ce(8λ +1 ) ) > 0













4Ce(48λ2 +1 6 λ − 1) − 3(48λ2 +3 2 λ − 1)
6(1 − 4λ)(12λ − 1)




2(48λ2 +1 6 λ − 1)
3(1 − 4λ)(12λ − 1)
< 0
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(4λ − 1)(12λ − 1)
> 0




τ(Ce,λ) ⇒ ψ(Ce,λ) >τ(Ce,λ).
Proof n. 3. We need to show that W∗
h c (Ce,λ) ≥ W∗
o whenever Ce ≤ c Ce(K,λ).Let Fh c−o(Ce,λ)
be the diﬀerence between the two welfare levels:
Fh c−o(Ce,λ): =W∗
h c (Ce,λ) − W∗
o =
λ2(4Ce − 9)2












it is easy to see that Fh c−o(Ce,λ) is convex in Ce and has a minimum in Ce = 6λ+1
8λ where
Fh c−o(6λ+1
8λ ,λ)=0 .H e n c eFh c−o(Ce,λ) ≥ 0 ∀λ,Ce ≤ c Ce(K,λ).
Proof n. 4. We need to show that τ(Ce,λ) >σ (Ce,λ).
Let
Fτ−σ(Ce,λ): =( τ(Ce,λ) − σ(Ce,λ))





48λ2 +1 6 λ − 1








3(48λ2 +2 0 λ − 1)














Hence, we know that Fτ−σ(Cτ−σ
e ,λ) is a global minimum and that Cτ−σ
e lies to the right of the
maximum possible value of Ce, 3
4 as implied by R2.







(12λ − 1)2 > 0
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we can conclude that Fτ−σ(Ce,λ) is always positive in the interval of values for Ce deﬁned by
R1. So τ>σ .
Proof n. 5. This is a generalization to n number of ﬁrms of proof 1. We need to show that
Wn∗
h c (Ce,λ,n) ≥ Wn∗
k (Ce,K,λ,n) whenever S∗
c ≥ Ce − Ce(K). To that purpose, notice that
Wn∗
h c (Ce,λ,n) ≥ Wn∗
k (Ce,K,λ,n) if (and only if):
K ≥
4C2
e(3n4λ2 +2 n3λ2 − n2λ2 +2 nλ − 1) − 4Ce(n +1 ) ( 3 n3λ2 + n2λ(2λ +1 )− nλ2 + λ − 1)
8λ(n +1 ) 2(2n2λ +2 nλ − 1)
+
+
(n +1 ) 2(3n2λ2 +2 nλ(λ +1 )− λ2 − 1)
8λ(n +1 ) 2(2n2λ +2 nλ − 1)
= φn(Ce,λ,n)
In o ws h o wt h a tK>φ n(Ce,λ,n) ∀ Ce, n, λ. Indeed, R1 implies:
K>
µ




to see that, let:
Fφ(Ce,λ,n): =
µ









=0⇐⇒ Ce = Cφ
e







(n2λ + nλ − 1)2





so Fφ(Ce,λ,n) is convex in Ce and Fφ(C
φ
e ,λ,n)=0is a global minimum.
Proof n. 6. This is a generalization to n number of ﬁrms of proof 2. We need to show that
ψn(Ce,λ,n) >σ n(Ce,λ,n).T od ot h a t ,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that ψn(Ce,λ,n) >τ n(Ce,λ,n),
as τn(Ce,λ,n) is shown to be bigger than σn(Ce,λ,n) in proof 8 (see below).
By R2:
n2λ + n(λ +1 )− 1 − 2Cen2λ>0





τn(Ce,λ,n) ⇒ ψ(Ce,λ) >τ(Ce,λ)
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n(n4λ2 +2 n2λ(1 − 2λ)+4 nλ − 1)
(n +1 ) ( 1− 2nλ)(2n2λ +2 nλ − 1)
< 0









(2nλ − 1)(2n2λ +2 nλ − 1)
> 0






Proof n. 7. This is a generalization to n number of ﬁrms of proof 3. We need to show that
Wn∗
h c (Ce,n,λ) ≥ Wn∗
o (Ce,n,λ) ∀n.
To see it, let:
Fh c−o
n (Ce,n,λ)=Wn∗

















n (Ce,n,λ) reaches a minimum and is equal to zero whenever Ce = Ce. That in turns
means that Wn∗
h c (Ce,n,λ) ≥ Wn∗
o (Ce,n,λ).
Proof n. 8. This is a generalization to n number of ﬁrms of proof 4. We need to show that
τn(Ce,λ,n) >σ n(Ce,λ,n) and we proceed in the same way of proof 4.
Let
Fτ−σ
n (Ce,λ,n): =( τn(Ce,λ,n) − σn(Ce,λ,n))
notice that, given λ ≥ 1 and n ≥ 2, Fτ−σ






4n4λ2 +2 n2λ(1 − 2λ)+4 nλ − 1





=0⇐⇒ Ce = Cτ−σ
e n
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we know then that Fτ−σ
n (Cτ−σ
e n,λ,n) is a global minimum. It is easy to notice, moreover, that
Cτ−σ
e n lies at the right hand side with respect to 1+n
2n which is the maximum value that can be




















(2n2λ +2 nλ − 1)2 > 0
we can conclude that Fτ−σ
n (Ce,λ,n) is always positive in the interval of values for Ce deﬁned by
R1. So τn >σ n.
Proof n. 9. To show that
∂τn(Ce,λ,n)
∂n < 0, ﬁr s to fa l l ,n o t i c et h a tt h en u m e r a t o ro fτn(Ce,λ,n)
is positive:





and substituting Ce = n+1
2n into the previous expression gets:






n − 1 > 0







n2λ + n(λ +1 )− 1 − 2Cen2λ







∂n < 0 ⇒
∂τn(Ce,λ,n)
∂n < 0.
Let us take the ﬁrst order partial derivative of F
√







4Cenλ(nλ − 1) + 2nλ(n − 1) − λ +1
(2n2λ +2 nλ − 1)2
¶
the denominator is obviously positive. The numerator is positive as well; notice in fact that
2nλ(n − 1) − λ>0
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as n ≥ 2. Given the negative sign, that means that
∂τn(Ce,λ,n)
∂n < 0. This in turn means that
∂τn(Ce,λ,n)
∂n < 0 in the interval deﬁned by R2.
Proof n. 10. We need to show that if the entrant is suﬃciently ineﬃcient, regardless of
the size of K, subsidization does not occur if the incumbent is domestic. To do so, notice that
FCAis preferred to NI if K ≤ σd(Ce,λ) and a necessary condition for VCAto be preferred to
FCAis Ce >
3(8λ+1)
4(8λ+3) (algebraic expressions are reported in Appendix B). Here I am showing that
Ce >
3(8λ+1)
4(8λ+3) =⇒ K>σ d(Ce,λ).I fw es o l v eσd(Ce,λ) as a function of K, we get that FCAÂ NI






















4(8λ+3) > Σd(K,λ).T h a ti m p l i e sK>σ d(Ce,λ) whenever Ce >
3(8λ+1)
4(8λ+3). That means
that if the entrant is suﬃciently ineﬃcient, regardless of the size of K, subsidy does not occur at
the equilibrium.
Proof n. 11. In this proof I show that VCAis never an optimal choice for the government. To
see that, we know that a necessary condition for VCAto be preferred is that it contemporaneously
yields an higher level of welfare with respect to both NI and FCA. That implies the following





However Ce < 6λ−1








6λ − 1 − 8Ceλ
4λ − 3
> 0
it is easy noticing that the above condition always holds whenever Ce < 6λ−1
8λ .
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Proof n. 12. When the entrant is eﬃcient, i.e. Ce < c Ce(K,λ), and the government has chosen
VCAin stage 1, the amount of subsidy granted exceeds the one strictly necessary to trigger entry.
That means that E’s proﬁts are positive. From a total welfare perspective, however, VCAis a
















































where the term in square brackets represents E’s proﬁts. VCAis superior to NI iﬀ:
K<
192C2
eλ2(4λ +3 )− 16Ceλ(72λ2 +4 2 λ + 11) + 432λ3 + 180λ2 +9 6 λ +1 3
32(12λ − 1)2 = τtw(Ce,λ)
since the comparative advantage of VCA with respect to NI is surely decreasing in λ in the
interval deﬁned by Ce < c Ce(K,λ),l e tu si m p o s eλ =1 ,s ot h a tVCA yields the maximum
possible level of welfare. We thus have:
τtw(Ce,1) =
1344C2
e − 2000Ce + 721
3872
By R1, K has to be bigger than
(1.5−2Ce)2







e − 5232Ce + 2223
34848





hence Ftw(Ce) is always greater than zero and K cannot be lower than τtw(Ce,λ),s oVCAis
never an optimal strategy for an Authority which maximizes total welfare if the incumbent is
European, even if the entrant is very eﬃcient and European as well.
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1.A.2 Minor Proofs
The optimal choices of the subsidy levels in the basic model








The optimal level of Sk is then:
S∗
k = K −
(1.5 − 2Ce)2
9




Wc(Ce,S c,λ): =CSc − qe · λSc =
(1.5 − (Ce − Sc))2
18
−
3 − 4(Ce − Sc)
6
· λSc
The optimal level of Sc is:
S∗
c = Ce −
3(3λ−1)+12λCe




8λ = c Ce(K,λ)
S∗
c = Ce − 3−6
√
K
4 if Ce > c Ce(K,λ)
it can be easily seen that Ce −
3(3λ−1)+12λCe
2(12λ−1) ≤ Ce − 3−6
√
K
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The comparison between FCA and VCA in the basic model






Let ∆(Ce,K,λ) be a positive function of the diﬀerence between the total cost of subsidizing E
with VCAminus the total cost of subsidizing E through FCA:
∆(Ce,K,λ): =





























Notice that whenever ∆(Ce,K,λ)=0(the two aid instrument have the same cost), VCAÂ















which is satisﬁed by R2.

















K, dCe > 0= ⇒ d∆ > 0.




2(4Ce − 5)(4Ce(8λ +1 )− 3(8λ +3 ) )
3(1 − 4λ)3 < 0
T h ee x t e n s i o no ft h em o d e lt onc o m p e t i n gﬁrms




























8n2 with Ce > c Cn
e (K,λ,n)
Mariniello, Mario (2008), Competition and the Role of Public Authorities 
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/138651.A. APPENDIX 35
The corresponding thresholds are:
• FCAis preferred to NI if:
K ≤
4C2
en2(2n2λ +1 )− 4Cen2(n +1 ) ( 2 nλ +1 )+( n +1 ) 2(2n2λ +2 n − 1)
8n2λ(n +1 ) 2 = σn(Ce,λ,n)
• VCAis preferred to NI if:
K ≤
µ
n2λ + n(λ +1 )− 1 − 2Cen2λ
2n2λ +2 nλ − 1
¶2
= τn(Ce,λ,n)
• VCAis preferred to FCAif:
K ≤
µ
2n3λ +2 n2(λ +1 )+n − 1 − 2Cen(2n2λ +1 )
2(n + 1)(2nλ − 1)
¶2
= ψn(Ce,λ,n)
T h ee x t e n s i o no ft h em o d e lt od o m e s t i ci n c u m b e n t











































where the last term in each expression are the incumbent’s proﬁts.
The corresponding thresholds are:
• FCAis preferred to NI if:
K<
16C2
e(8λ +3 )− 48Ce(4λ +1 )+9 ( 8 λ +1 )
288λ
= σd(Ce,λ)
• VCAis preferred to NI if:
K<
µ
6λ − 1 − 8λCe
3(4λ − 1)
¶2
= τd(Ce,λ) ∩ Ce <
6λ − 1
8λ
• VCAis preferred to FCAif:
K<
(4Ce(8λ +3 )− 3(8λ +1 ) ) 2
36(4λ − 3)2 = ψd(Ce,λ) ∩ Ce <
3(8λ +1 )
4(8λ +3 )
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ﬁgure 1 - State aid instruments’ cost
στ ψ
FCA > NI FCA < NI
VCA > NI VCA < NI
VCA > FCA VCA < FCA
ﬁgure 2 - The thresholds for K
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ﬁgure 4 - Welfare levels for given Ce = .675 and λ =2
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ﬁgure 6 - The government’s choice when VCAis banned
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2.1 Introduction
In March 2000, the European Council committed the European Union to become ’the most
dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world’ through a series of actions
which came to be known as Lisbon strategy. After two years, in Barcelona, the European Council
set the goal for overall spending on Research & Development (R&D) to 3% of GDP to be reached
by 2010.
In the light of Lisbon and Barcelona, the European Commission has recently launched the
"State Aid Action Plan" (SAAP) a road map to the modernization of the current Community
framework for state aid. The proposed goal of the SAAP is a reﬁned economic approach which
would allow Member States to target market failures limiting market’s distortions.
Within this context, the Commission shows to be particularly worried by young and small-
medium enterprises (SMEs) which more likely are aﬀected by asymmetric information and hence
experience diﬃculties to develop and carry on R&D projects at most. SME’s and young ﬁrms are
thus allowed to beneﬁt from exceptions to the general provision of the European Treaty according
to which state aid should not be used by Member States.
The ’market failure’ argument is, however, not suﬃcient to support such policy: a com-
prehensive economic analysis which takes into consideration the cost of introducing a state aid
scheme targeting small ﬁrms is indeed needed in order to assess its optimality from a total welfare
perspective.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of the proposed rules on a speciﬁc issue
where this conﬂict is particularly relevant: state aid to overcome ﬁnancial market’s imperfections.
A large body of the economic literature has tackled the problem of stimulating R&D through
state subsidy, starting from the consideration that, due to its public good features, private in-
vestment in R&D tends to be less than socially desirable. A subset of this literature, mainly
empirical, focuses on the assessment of the incentive eﬀect of public funding, asking whether the
relationship between public and private R&D investments is on balance characterized by ’comple-
mentarity’ or by ’substitution’. David et al. (2000) and Klette et al. (2000) survey the existing
literature concluding that a complementary relationship between privately and publicly ﬁnanced
R&D is often found in the empirical analyses but also that these results are usually not sustained
by appropriate econometric methodology. García-Quevedo (2004) studies the existing empirical
literature with a meta-econometric analysis and ﬁnds that no clear answer can be deducted by
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evidence, given the ambiguity of the reported results.
This paper moves from the same concern about the eﬀectiveness of public support to R&D and
proposes a theoretical framework focused on ﬁrms’ access to capital market where such concern
is addressed. The aim is to reproduce in a simple setting some of the results which have been
found in the theoretical1 and empirical literature in imperfect ﬁnancial market and to assess in
that setting the impact of diﬀerent state aid policies.
The model that is described in Section 2 is based on a simpliﬁed version of Holmström and
Tirole (1997, henceforth HT). HT describe an incentive model of ﬁnancial intermediation in which
ﬁrms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained. They deﬁne a two periods game where
players sign a ﬁnancial contract in the ﬁrst period and investment returns are realized in the
second one. Due to moral hazard and limited borrowing capacity, capital-poor ﬁrms are unable
to invest, whilst ﬁrms with strong balance sheets have better access to market ﬁnance and are less
aﬀected by credit crunches. The moral hazard problem is partially solved by monitoring which
reduces managers’ private beneﬁto fs h i r k i n g .
The model developed in this paper does not explore the monitoring issue nor it considers
diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ balance sheets. Instead, ﬁrms diﬀer by the quantity and quality of informa-
tion they are able to provide to banks when they present their projects. This is a particularly
relevant issue since, coherently with the new capital requirement agreement (Basel II), banks
are progressively turning to an internal assessment process rather than using the initial capital
measurement system (Basel I) when deciding whether to grant a loan or not. Thus a good project
presented by a ﬁrm which is more easily ranked by banks is more likely to be funded. On the other
hand, a ﬁrm which is almost unknown to the bank, which has no or few experience in innovation
or which is unable to provide enough details on the proposed activity, has a high probability
of not being funded regardless of the quality of its project. The ’informative ability’ of a ﬁrm
in the model is proxied by a variable si and it is assumed to be directly correlated with ﬁrm’s
size and experience. As noted above, the European Commission considers ﬁrms’ size and age
very relevant in the context of imperfect ﬁnancial market due to asymmetric information.2 The
asymmetric information problem relies, in fact, on the assumption that the proposing subject has
1For a review on corporate ﬁnancing, see Cestone (1999).
2In the Community Guidelines for Aid to Risk Capital (pg. 8), the Commission states: ’the main source of
the market failures relevant to the supply of risk capital aﬀecting in particular SMEs at an early stage of their
development is imperfect and asymmetric information. This implies that potential investors face large diﬃculties
and high costs in gathering reliable information on the business prospects of a SME or a new company. These
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usually better information on the likelihood of success of the project than the possible investor.
The premium oﬀered to compensate this lack of information represents the reason why external
ﬁnance is more costly than internal ﬁnance (Akerlof, 1970 - Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This kind
of problems is most likely to be observed whenever a ﬁrm has greater diﬃculties to signal its
own degree of reliability and, consequently, it aﬀects more young and small-medium enterprises
justifying public intervention.3
Recent surveys on managers’ opinion conﬁrm that the existence of this information problem
is felt particularly by young ﬁrms and SMEs. According to the ’Observatory of European SMEs’
(2003):
- 41% of European SMEs have credit lines with one single bank, only 5% have
credit lines with more than three banks
- A basic condition for providing loans to enterprises is that the banks have suﬃ-
cient information about the enterprises to access the applications
- Often the problem of inadequate information is mentioned as one of the main
aspects hampering bank ﬁnance to SMEs.
- There is a positive correlation between the size of an enterprise and the informa-
tion provided to banks.
- Access to bank ﬁnance has become more diﬃc u l tw i t h i nt h el a s tt w e l v em o n t h s
because of collateral demand, increased transparency requirements and increased doc-
umentation requirements.
According to ’UNICE’ (Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne - 2005):
many banks have begun determining the individual risk proﬁle of the borrower
through an internal rating procedure. This implies increased scrutinity on the part
of the lending institutions of a borrower’s business operations and ﬁnancial structure.
In order to properly assess the risk involved in a lending transaction, the ﬁnancial
problems are particularly signiﬁcant for companies where the assessment oft h er i s k si n v o l v e di sm o r eu n c e r t a i n ,
i.e. for companies without any track record and/or available collateral and/or proprietary intellectual property, or
for highly innovative or risky projects such as those related to the development of new technologies" .
3Several empirical works conﬁrm these theoretical predictions (see for example: Devereux and Schiantarelli -
1990, Schiﬀer and Weder - 2001, Beck et al. - 2005). Hall (2002) provides a nice survey on that literature. According
to Hall, there is clear evidence that ’small and start-up ﬁrms in the R&D-intensive industries face a higher cost of
capital than their larger competitors and than ﬁrms in other industries’.
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institutions need to have suﬃcient knowledge about the line of business a company is
involved in. This applies, in particular, to start-up companies.
Given these remarks, the model described in the following Section sets up a coherent theo-
retical framework where state aid is analyzed according to those characteristics that, as we have
just seen, appear to be crucial in hampering ﬁrm’s access to funding. To that purpose, two new
variables with respect to the HT framework are introduced: S and si:
• S is an exogenous ﬁxed (sunk) cost sustained by ﬁrms willing to get funding. Whenever a
ﬁrm has an idea for an innovative project and needs external ﬁnancing to develop it, it is
required to produce some information. This information concerns the project but also the
ﬁrm itself. Typically the following information are required:
- a description of the project
- identity, background and audited ﬁnancial statements of managers (i.e. information con-
cerning the promoter’s capability to implement the planned project)
- analysis of the products/services demand over the project’s life
- information on project costs and its detailed components
- information on ﬁnancial and economic proﬁtability.4
In the model it is assumed that S is a ﬁxed cost which is the same regardless of ﬁrm’s
characteristics. Small ﬁrms are obviously more penalized since the eﬀort they are required
to make is higher if proportioned to their internal resources. The model in the paper does
not take into consideration that issue because the focus is on another source of asymmetry
which is the intrinsic diﬀerent ability that ﬁrms have to show the quality of their projects.
But the model could be easily adapted by diﬀerentiating ﬁrms in their assets too.
• si represents the probability that the bank has to detect ﬁrm’s type. When a ﬁrm presents
a project, the bank has si probability to understand if the project has high probability of
success (the ﬁrm is ’good’ in the terminology used in the model) or it has low probability
(the ﬁrm is ’bad’) and 1−si probability of having no knowledge on the type of the ﬁrm. si
is assumed to be exogenous and independent of ﬁrm’s type but directly correlated to ﬁrm’s
4Source: European Investment Bank
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size or experience. The idea is that a bigger or well established ﬁrm is more easily assessed
by banks with respect to a young ﬁrm which is just starting a new activity or with respect
to a SME which has relationship with only one or few banks. As we have seen above, SMEs
feel the inadequacy of the information they are able to provide as one of the main barrier
to their access to bank’s ﬁnancing. Big ﬁrms have often speciﬁc division and hire experts
on purpose for assessing the quality of their projects. Young and small ﬁrms usually spend
all their resources in the development of a project and are not able to provide detailed
information on its success’ likelihood.
The model described in the following Section shows that granting a subsidy to a small or
young ﬁrm can be optimal for a welfare maximizing authority if the proportion of ﬁrms with a
high probability of success in the economy is suﬃciently large. This result is less trivial than it
might appear. Indeed, subsidizing small or young ﬁrms has a greater positive eﬀect on innovation
(because those are the ﬁrms which are more aﬀected by the market failure) but it entails a higher
cost for society. This cost is due to the fact that the probability that the subsidy beneﬁts a ﬁrm
with low probability of success is higher when the ’informative power’ of the ﬁrm is lower i.e.
when the ﬁrm is small or young.
One way to reduce that source of costs is to grant the subsidy only after the bank has
screened the ﬁrms; this allows the government to exploit the bank’s ﬁlter in order to identify only
those ﬁrms which would not be able to develop the innovative project without the government’s
intervention. As we are going to see, the model shows that this kind of aid is more eﬀective with
bigger or more experienced ﬁrms, as the costs’ saving is greater when the ﬁrm’s informative power
is higher.
The rest of the paper is organized as it follows: Section 2 describes and solves the model;
conclusions are discussed in Section 3. Proofs are reported in the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 The Basic Set-up
There are two players: a borrowing ﬁrm i and a lending bank l.F i r mi can be of two types: with
probability α ∈ [0,1] the ﬁrm is good type (θ = g); with probability 1 − α the ﬁrm is bad type
(θ = b) . T h et y p eo ft h eﬁrm is strictly related to the probability of success if the ﬁrm invest
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in an innovation project. The parameter α can thus be interpreted as the proportion of good
ﬁrms in the economy i.e. the proportion of ﬁrms which present a project with high probability
of success.5
Having enough ﬁnancial resources, ﬁrm i could invest I in a project which yields R with
probability p(θ). A good ﬁrm has probability 1 of success while a bad ﬁrm has probability 0
of success. Both types have an outside option of B with probability 1 if they invest the money
received somewhere else and not in the research project. The value of the outside option is
assumed to be lower with respect to the expected value of the project for a good ﬁrm: R>B .
The parameters’ values are known to all players. In addition, investing in the outside option is
socially ineﬃcient: B<I .6
Firm i has zero net private asset and it needs a loan from the bank in order to invest.7 To
do so, ﬁrm i has to sustain some ﬁxed cost of entry S which represents the amount of eﬀort
required by the bank for providing information concerning ﬁrm’s type. The bank may guess the
ﬁrm’s type with probability si while it gets no information with probability 1−si.B o t hS and si
are assumed to be exogenous and unrelated to ﬁrm’s type. si, however, is an idiosyncratic term
which is speciﬁco ft h eﬁrm and depends positively on its size or experience.
The total cost of the investment is hence T = I + S. It is assumed that the total cost of
investment is higher than the expected return from a project developed by a bad type: T>0.
Financing a bad ﬁrm is thus welfare detrimental, besides being not proﬁt a b l ef o rt h eb a n k .
Financing a good ﬁr mi s ,i n s t e a d ,p r o ﬁtable if R is suﬃciently large. In order to have such result,
it is suﬃcient to restrict our analysis to the interval for which R>T+B,f o rar e a s o nw h i c hw i l l
become clearer later.
During the bargaining phase, the bank proposes a contract to ﬁrm i making a take-it or leave-
it oﬀer. The contract is such that the gain from success in the development of the innovation is
split between the ﬁrm and the bank according to their bargaining power.
E(Rθ
i)=µ(R − T)p(θ)+ξ (2.1)
5To have an idea on how much could be α in the real economy, notice that the percentage of successful innovators
in some Member States varies from 19% (UK, low-technology sector) to 70% (Germany, high tecnology sector).
Source: CIS3 (Community Innovation Survey).
6For ease of exposition, here I am not discussing the origin of these parameters and consider them exogenous.
Notice, however, that these parameters are coherent with the setting depicted by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)
where moral hazard is possible.
7The gross private asset is however suﬃcient to cover administrative costs such as S as it is deﬁned later.
Mariniello, Mario (2008), Competition and the Role of Public Authorities 
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/1386546 CHAPTER 2. SHOULD SMALL OR YOUNG FIRMS BE SUBSIDIZED?
E(Rθ
l )=( 1− µ)(R − T)p(θ) − ξ (2.2)
where E(Rθ
i) and E(Rθ
l ) are the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm and the lender, respectively, and
µ ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of revenue going to ﬁrm i in case of success. ξ is a lump sum beneﬁtt h a t
the bank grants to the ﬁrm in order to prevent moral hazard. It can be easily shown that ξ = B
whenever µ =0and θ = g.
In the following it is assumed that µ =0i.e. the bank gets all the surplus generated by
the project in case of success. This assumption helps to simplify the model and it is relatively
innocuous: as long as µ 6=1 , a reduction in the total cost of the investment due to a subsidy
increases the bank’s willingness to ﬁnance, as we are going to see in the following. A diﬀerent µ
would imply a diﬀerent size of the subsidy necessary to trigger a ﬁnancing decision. The eﬀect of
a change in the size of the needed subsidy is however already totally captured by an increase in
B or a reduction in R, which are the determinants of the bank’s proﬁts. Summarizing:
• nature plays and chooses the ﬁrm’s type. The ﬁrm can be either good (with probability α)
or bad (with probability 1 − α).
• ﬁrm i observes its own type and decides whether to present a project proposal to the bank
(IN) or to stay out from the innovation market (OUT). In the ﬁrst case, ﬁrm i has to bear
a ﬁxed cost S. In the second case the ﬁrm makes zero proﬁt.
• if ﬁrm i has presented the project, nature plays and chooses whether the bank detects the
ﬁrm i’s type (with probability si) or not (with probability 1 − si).
• the bank decides whether to ﬁnance (F)o rn o t( NF) ﬁrm i.
F i g u r e1r e p r e s e n t st h eg a m et r e eo ft h eb a s i cm o d e l :
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ﬁgure 1 - Game Tree. Payoﬀs are ordered as: i) total welfare ii) ﬁrm’s proﬁts iii) bank’s proﬁts
2.2.2 Solution of the Basic Model
Suppose that the bank can detect the ﬁrm’s type with certainty: si =1 . By assumption, lending
to a bad ﬁrm is unproﬁtable. Thus only good ﬁrms are ﬁnanced. In that case, the bank would






l )=( R − T) − B (2.4)
under these conditions, indeed, the good ﬁrm has no incentive to deviate the money received from
the bank in the outside option.
Now, suppose that no information on the ﬁrm’s type is available to the bank: si =0 .
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Two pooling equilibria and a mixed strategy equilibrium may arise. Depending on the pro-
p o r t i o no fg o o dt y p e sα (i.e. on the probability that a good ﬁrm is knocking at the bank’s door),
the bank may or may not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to ﬁnance an ’unknown’ type ﬁrm. Formally, the bank
grants a loan to a ﬁrm if:
E(Rl)=α(R − B) − T ≥ 0
that is: the loan is granted only if the expected gains of the lender are higher than the total
investment cost.
To have lending (and thus possible innovation) at the equilibrium, the proportion of good
types must hence be suﬃciently high:




Two pure strategy equilibria may arise: an equilibrium where both the good and the bad type
enter and the bank ﬁnances the ﬁrm if α ≥ α and an equilibrium where nobody enters the market
for innovation since the bank does not ﬁnance an unknown type ﬁrm if α<α .I nt h eﬁrst case,
probability of innovation is α,t h eﬁrm’s proﬁts are B (whatever the type) and the bank’s proﬁts
are α(R − B) − T.
Since the ﬁrm has to sustain a ﬁxed cost to propose the project (i.e. entry is risky), a mixed
strategy equilibrium where a good ﬁrm enters with probability 1 and a bad ﬁrm randomizes
between entering or staying out can arise too if α<α .8 This happens whenever the bank has
belief such that it attaches α probability to the left node of the infoset i.e. whenever it believes
a ﬁrm the type of which has not been detected to be good with probability α.I n t h a t c a s e ,
the bank randomizes between ﬁnancing and not ﬁnancing. Formally, let σθ be the probability
attached by type θ to entering and η be the probability attached by the bank to the ﬁnancing
decision whenever it is unaware of ﬁrm’s type, we have:
σg =1
σb =





In this equilibrium the probability of innovation is α S
B+S and both the ﬁrm (no matter the
type) and the bank have zero proﬁts. The intuition why the good type is also making zero proﬁt
is the following: the bad type randomizes between IN and OUT,s oi nb o t hc a s e si th a sz e r o
8Indeed, if entry was not risky, the bad ﬁrm would always enter the market for innovation with probability 1.
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expected proﬁts. Since si =0 , there is no way the bank can distinguish between the two types
and they are both treated in the same way. Hence the good type’s expected proﬁts are zero as
well.
Since the pure strategy equilibrium where no lending occurs and the mixed strategy equilib-
rium coexist when α<α , we need to select one of them in order to go on with the analysis.
The mixed strategy equilibrium is superior with respect to the pure strategy one according to
a forward induction criterion since the good type has always at least a weak incentive to enter
whenever si ≥ 0. I henceforth assume that the mixed strategy equilibrium occurs if α<α .
Now let si ∈ (0,1). That is: there is a positive probability that the bank is able to guess the
ﬁrm’s type.





s represents the level of si above which the equilibria reached are the same of the full detection
benchmark. When si > s, in fact, a bad ﬁrm has negative expected proﬁts when entering the
market for innovation since the probability of being detected is too high compared to the beneﬁt
it gets by being ﬁnanced. It turns out that when si > s only a good ﬁrm asks a loan to the bank.
The bank is thus able to select the ﬁrms and oﬀer a contract just to good ﬁrms.
Within the interval si ∈ [0,s) the mixed strategy equilibrium arises whenever α<α .A sw e
have seen, in that case, a good ﬁrm enters the market for innovation with probability 1 while a












(1 − si)(B + S)
Notice that given these parameters, if a ﬁrm’s type is not detected, the bank has α probability
of facing a good type (this is why the bank randomizes between the two diﬀerent choices).





and welfare is composed as
it follows: a good ﬁrm has expected proﬁts si(B + S),ab a dﬁrm has expected proﬁts equal to
zero and the bank has expected proﬁts equal to αsi(R − B − T). Notice that the good type’s
expected proﬁts tend to 0 for si → 0 and to B for si → s.
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After having solved the basic model, we can then conclude that innovation likelihood is below
its potential because of imperfection in the ﬁnancial markets whenever si < s and α<α .I nt h a t
case, social welfare is given by:
W = αsi(R − I)
and a government G may be willing to subsidize the ﬁrm in order to stimulate innovation and
maximize welfare. The following Section deals with that issue.
2.2.3 The State Aid Game
Let us assume that si < s and α<α . A state aid system is now introduced in the basic model.
Players are now three since a government is also playing the game. At the beginning of the game,
the government may grant a lump-sum subsidy x with a certain probability q.I f g r a n t e d , t h e
subsidy reduces the total cost of investing T by x if the bank accepts to ﬁnance the project.
The aid is thus not a free grant: since it is granted in the form of a reduction of the total cost of
the investment, the ﬁrm is entitled to get the aid only if it will be ﬁnanced by the bank. Notice,
however, that the government is not able to discriminate among ﬁrms on the basis of their type
since it does not have access to the same information provided to the bank. All players know if
the aid is granted before ﬁrm i decides whether to enter the market for innovation or not. As
the subsidy is granted before the ﬁrm and the bank play, this scheme is called the ex-ante aid
scheme.
The amount of aid x is assumed to be suﬃciently large to induce a ﬁnancing decision when
the bank does not know the ﬁrm’s type i.e. x = T − α(R − B): a greater subsidy would be
ineﬃcient; a lower one would be useless. Indeed, a bank ﬁnds ﬁnancing to yield non negative
proﬁts if and only if T − x ≤ α(R − B).




i)+E(Rl) − λxq (2.7)
where λ is the shadow cost per unit of subsidy and q is the probability that the ﬁrm gets the
subsidy at the beginning of the game. I henceforth assume that λ =1that is: the tax system
is eﬃcient. We can accept such (unrealistic) assumption for two reasons: ﬁrst of all it simpliﬁes
the model helping us to focus on the parameters of interests. Secondly, and most important,
this assumption does not imply that granting a subsidy is not costly for the government, in this
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context. Since the government is not able to guess the type of the ﬁrm, there is a possibility
that the subsidy is granted to a bad ﬁrm. In that case welfare is reduced since, by assumption,
the outside option B has lower value with respect to I, the cost of investing in the development
of an innovation. Hence, granting a subsidy might be welfare detrimental even if the transfer of
resources from the government to ﬁrms is perfectly eﬃcient.
It turns out that, whatever is its type, if the ﬁrm knows to be entitled to get the subsidy at
the beginning of the game, it enters the market for innovation and it is ﬁnanced by the bank,
with the exception of the case in which its type is bad and its type is detected by the bank.
The following payoﬀ structure then occurs:
E(R
g
i)=qB +( 1− q)si(B + S) (2.8)
E(Rb
i)=q((1 − si)B − siS) (2.9)
E(Rl)=q(α(1 − α)si(R − B)) + (1 − q)(αsi(R − B − T)) (2.10)
E(W)=q((1 − α)(B(1 − si)+Isi)+αR − T)+( 1− q)αsi(R − I) (2.11)







where χ is the probability that innovation takes place. Let us discuss each single equation in
order to clarify the origin of these expressions. Notice that when the subsidy is not granted (with
probability 1 − q) the payoﬀs are the same of those obtained with the basic model.
(2.8) represents the expected proﬁts for a good ﬁrm. By deﬁn i t i o n ,i faﬁrm is subsidized, it
is ﬁnanced by the bank when the bank is not able to guess its type. Since the good ﬁrm enters
the market for innovation with probability 1, that means that if the good ﬁrm is entitled to the
subsidy, it is ﬁnanced with certainty: indeed, if its type is not detected, it is still proﬁtable for
the bank to ﬁnance it because of the subsidy. Thus, if the good ﬁrm receives a subsidy it has
expected proﬁts equal to B.
(2.9) represents the expected proﬁts for a bad ﬁrm. The bad ﬁrm can be ﬁnanced only if
its type is not detected. In addition, recall that the bad ﬁrm has 0 expected proﬁts when the
government does not play the game. If the subsidy is granted, the bad ﬁrm enters the market for
innovation with probability 1 (recall that s<s and hence the ﬁrm has expected proﬁts which
are higher than expected loss in case the bank detects its type).
By entering the market for innovation, the bad ﬁrm gets B with probability 1−si if it is not
detected and looses S with probability si i ft h eo p p o s i t eh a p p e n s .
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(2.10) is the expression of the bank’s expected proﬁts. Since both types enter with probability
1, when the subsidy is granted the bank’s proﬁts are given by the sum of:
(i) the probability that the ﬁrm is good times the gain from ﬁnancing a good ﬁrm:
α(R − B − (T − x))
(ii) the probability that the ﬁrm is bad and it is erroneously ﬁnanced times the loss given by
ﬁnancing a bad ﬁrm:
(1 − α)(1 − si)(−(T − x))
Substituting for x we get that the expected proﬁts when the subsidy is granted are indeed
α(1 − α)si(R − B).
(2.11) represents the expected welfare which is computed as in (2.7). When the subsidy is
granted, indeed, welfare is given by the sum of: the proﬁts of the good ﬁrm times the probability
that the ﬁrm is good (αB); the proﬁts of the bad ﬁrm times the probability that the ﬁrm is
bad ((1 − α)((1 − si)B − siS)); the proﬁts of the bank (α(1 − α)si(R − B))m i n u sx times the
probability that a ﬁr mw h i c hi se n t i t l e dt og e tt h es u b s i d ya c t u a l l yu s e si t :x(1−(1−α)si),i . e .i f
a ﬁrm is bad and its type is detected (this happens with probability (1−α)si), it is not ﬁnanced
even if it is entitled to get the subsidy. Putting the terms together and simplifying results in the
expression reported in (2.11). Another way to look at it is the following: when the subsidy is
granted, welfare is the sum of the total gain for society, which is given by αR+(1−α)(1−si)B,
minus the total cost, which is given by S (which is always sustained since both types enter the
market with probability 1)p l u s(1 − si(1 − α))I ( w h i c hi st h ec o s to ft h ei n v e s t m e n ti nt h ec a s e
the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced).
(2.12) ﬁnally is the probability that innovation occurs at the equilibrium. As it can be noticed,







αq.T h a ti s :t h e
lower are si or S,t h em o r ee ﬀective in raising innovation is the subsidy.
2.2.4 The Subsidization Choice
Let us suppose that the government can observe only si. That is: the government does not know
whether a ﬁrm is good or bad but it knows whether the bank is more or less able to detect its type
on the basis of the available information. In particular, the government may adopt the following
Mariniello, Mario (2008), Competition and the Role of Public Authorities 
European University Institute
DOI: 10.2870/138652.2. THE MODEL 53
rule: if the ﬁrm has a low informative ability, it can be subsidized. Notice that this kind of policy
is usually implemented by governments, provided that si is a proxy of ﬁrm’s experience or size
(i.e. young or small ﬁrms have a low si). What is the optimal threshold for subsidization from the
p o i n to fv i e wo ft h eg o v e r n m e n t ?L e te s be the threshold below which a ﬁrm is entitled to get the
subsidy and recall that we are focusing on the interval where the intervention of the government
is needed in order to boost innovation (i.e. si < s and α<α ). Notice that letting just one ﬁrm
play the game is equivalent to assume that ﬁrms with diﬀerent sj parameter are drawn from a
uniform distribution.
The government deﬁnes the function q(si) as to maximize the following welfare function:
E(W)=[ ( αR +( 1− α)(1 − si)B − S − (1 − (1 − α)si)I)]q(si)+
[αsi(R − I)](1 − q(si)) (2.13)
Maximizing (2.13) we get the following claim:
Claim 2.1 The optimal subsidy function is
q(si)=1 if si < e s and α>e α
q(si)=0 otherwise
where e s =1− S
α(R−B)−(I−B) and e α = I−B
R−B .
Proof. Equation (2.13) can be rewritten as follows:
E(W)=ϕ(si,α,R,B,I,S)q(si)+ε(si,α,R,I)
where ϕ(.)=S +(1−si)(α(R−B)−(I −B)) and ε(.) is a known function of parameters which
are independent of q(si). It turns out that the optimal subsidy policy implies q(si)=1whenever
ϕ(.) ≥ 0 and q(si)=0whenever ϕ(.) < 0.
We can then state the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1 Provided that the proportion of high innovative ability ﬁr m si ss u ﬃciently high,
the higher is the total investment’s cost, the smaller (or younger) should be the ﬁrm which is
entitled to get the aid.
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Proof. It follows directly from Claim 2.1.
Proposition 2.1 suggests that it might be optimal for the government to target only ﬁrms
which are smaller or younger than a deﬁned threshold if the probability of success for ﬁrms in
the economy is suﬃciently high (because otherwise it would not be worthy to induce a ﬁnancing
decision of the bank).9 As the total cost of subsidization increases (that happens whenever B,
S or I increase), this threshold gets smaller, because a greater positive eﬀect of the subsidy on
welfare is needed in order to compensate its higher cost. And obviously the subsidy is relatively
more eﬀective when the market failure due to asymmetric information is more evident i.e. when
si is small. Interestingly, the positive eﬀect of granting a subsidy to a small ﬁrm dominates the
cost of subsidizing a ﬁrm which might be bad with an higher probability, given that it is harder
for the bank to screen it.
In addition, notice that e s is always smaller than s. Indeed:
ρ(s,e s)=s − e s =
S(T − α(R − B))
(S + B)(α(R − B) − (I − B))
> 0 (2.14)
Since we are assuming that ﬁrms are uniformly distributed, ρ(s,e s) represents the proportion
of ﬁrms which need the aid without getting it. They need the aid because there is a probability
that they will not be ﬁnanced even if they are good, since their informative power is lower than
what should be in order to trigger a ﬁnancing decision by the bank with probability 1 (si < s).
However, they do not get the aid, because their informative power is so high that the relative
gain from stimulating innovation is inferior to the relative cost of the aid, which is represented
by the risk of making a bad ﬁrm to be ﬁnanced (si > e s). Indeed, ρ(s,e s) is increasing in S and
I and decreasing in α and R,t h a ti s :ρ(s,e s) depends positively on the total cost of investment
and negatively on the proportion of ﬁrms with high innovative ability in the economy and on the
expected gain from innovation.
Proposition 2.2 The optimal subsidy threshold implies always a proportion of ﬁrms which do
not get the aid even if they would need it in order to innovate.
Proof. It follows directly from (2.14).
We can then conclude that under the ex-ante aid scheme where ﬁrms apply for the subsidy
before submitting their project to banks, only small or unexperienced ﬁrms should be entitled to
get the subsidy.
9Indeed it is possible to prove that the government would never choose to implement a state aid system if α<h α.
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In the next Section I propose an alternative aid scheme in which the aid is granted after the
project is submitted to banks. As we are going to see, this changes the government’s target policy.
2.2.5 A Proposal for an Alternative Subsidy Scheme
In the aid scheme which has been analyzed in the previous section, subsidization is suboptimal
when ﬁrms are not small enough (si > e s). In this section, I propose an alternative aid scheme
which might suggest a diﬀerent target policy for the government. The idea is to ﬁnd a way
to exploit the ability that the bank has to guess the ﬁrm’s type in order to grant the subsidy
only when it is strictly necessary i.e. when the bank is not able to recognize the ﬁrm’s type.
In the previous aid scheme that does not happen: since the aid is granted before the project is
submitted to the bank, even if the ﬁrm is recognized to be good (and hence, in principle, it would
not need the aid for being ﬁnanced by the bank) it is still entitled to get it. If, instead, the aid is
granted only when it is strictly necessary, i.e. when the type of the ﬁrm is not detected, there is
a comparative advantage for granting a subsidy to bigger ﬁrms since the bigger is si the lower is
the expected cost of the grant.
Let us assume that players know if the aid is granted only after the project has been submitted
to the bank and the aid does not depend on ﬁrm’s characteristics. In other words, while in the
previous aid scheme the government was granting the aid on the basis of ﬁrm’s size/experience,
now the government is subsidizing ﬁrms randomly: now whatever is the ﬁrm’s size or experience,
it has γ probability to get a subsidy (γ is assumed to be exogenous). After having assessed the
project, the bank has three possibilities: to ﬁnance the ﬁrm directly (F), not to ﬁnance the ﬁrm
(NF) or to sign a contract which conditions the ﬁnancing on the state’s subsidy (FG). If FGis
chosen, the ﬁrm applies for the subsidy and receives it with probability γ. In that case the project
is ﬁnanced. Otherwise, with probability 1 − γ, the project is discharged. Indeed, the bank may
choose this last possibility whenever it believes that the riskiness of the project is too high with
respect to the cost of investing if the aid is not granted while it is not if the aid is granted, since
the aid reduces the investment’s cost. As the aid is granted only after the ﬁrm and the bank have
played, this scheme is called the ex-post aid scheme.
The ex-post aid scheme is equivalent to a scheme where banks and not ﬁrms are the subject
entitled to ask for a subsidy to the government, assuming that this procedure is costly. Here
the cost is represented by the possible loss of proﬁts that happens when the bank applies for the
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subsidy without getting it.
The advantage of this aid scheme consists in the fact that now the government grants a
subsidy only after the bank has evaluated the project. That reduces the cost of subsidization for
two reasons: ﬁrst of all because if the bank guesses the type of the ﬁrm and the ﬁrm is good, the
subsidy is not granted (as we are going to see below, γ is assumed to be suﬃciently low so that
the bank prefers to ﬁnance directly a ﬁrm which is surely good). Secondly, because as far as the
subsidy is not granted with certainty before the entry decision, bad ﬁrms have a lower incentive
to enter the market for innovation, since the probability that they are not going to be ﬁnanced
is higher with respect to the previous aid scheme.
On the other hand, notice that this aid scheme may be not eﬀective when ﬁrms are very
small/unexperienced. That happens because very small ﬁrms are not ﬁnanced if the probability
of subsidization is not equal to 1.
When the game is played within this new setting, we get the following results. First of all, let
us deﬁne the following thresholds:
γ :=
R − B − T
















Concerning threshold (2.15), notice that whenever γ>γ, the bank always prefers FG with
respect to F, that is: the bank prefers to condition the funding decision on the state aid instead of
directly ﬁnancing the ﬁrm.10 The intuition for this result is simple: suppose γ =1 .W h ys h o u l da
bank not apply for government’s subsidy? it raises its expected proﬁts (because total investment
cost is reduced by the subsidy) without running any risk (because the subsidy is granted with
certainty). More generally, if γ>γ, implementing this aid scheme does not save any cost with
respect to the previous aid scheme because even if the ﬁrm is surely good the bank chooses FG.
On the contrary, if γ<γ that means that if a ﬁrm is good and the bank detects its type, the
bank prefers to ﬁnance the ﬁrm directly instead of relying on a possible subsidy, because in the
last case it would run the risk of loosing a proﬁtable investment opportunity with a suﬃciently
high probability 1 − γ>1 − γ. The probability of getting the subsidy is then assumed to lie
below threshold (2.15): γ<γ.
10Indeed, suppose the bank knows that the ﬁrm is good. With F, the bank has proﬁts equal to: πF = R−B−T;
with FG,i n s t e a d ,i t sp r o ﬁts are: πFG = γ(R − B − (T − x)).I tt u r n so u tt h a ti fγ>γthen πFG >π F.
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Concerning threshold (2.16), notice that since the aid is now drawn after a ﬁrm has already
entered the market for innovation, the ﬁrm’s entering strategy changes according to the probability
of getting the subsidy. Indeed, threshold (2.16) identiﬁes the value for si a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c h
only one or both types enter with probability 1.I f si <sthen both types enter the market
for innovation (notice that s is increasing in γ). On the contrary, if si >s , a mixed strategy
equilibrium where the good type enters with probability 1 and the bad type randomizes occurs.
The reason for that depends on bad type’s expected proﬁts which are negative if the probability
of being detected is too high. Notice that if γ were equal to 1, we would have the same threshold
s which we observed in the previous aid scheme. Indeed, by making the subsidy uncertain, the
government enlarges the interval of values for si for which entering the market with probability
1 is unproﬁtable for bad ﬁrms.
It is possible to show that if si <s , implementing the ex-post aid scheme makes the government
to reach a lower level of welfare with respect to the ex-ante aid scheme. The intuition is as follows:
when si is very low, the proposed aid scheme increases the likelihood of innovation but it does not
equally reduce the cost of subsidization. Indeed, suppose that si =0 . The proposed aid scheme
does not let the government save any money because the ﬁrm would always need the aid (i.e. the
bank cannot be sure about the ﬁrm’s type, so no money is saved when the ﬁrm is good) and a
bad ﬁrm would enter with probability 1. Proof 1 in the Appendix shows this result.
Proposition 2.3 The ex-post aid scheme is suboptimal if granted to very small or young ﬁrms
with respect to the ex-ante aid scheme. The threshold which identiﬁes those ﬁrms, s,i sap o s i t i v e
function of the exogenous probability of getting the subsidy after having applied for it.
Proof. See proof 1 in the Appendix.
If s>s i >s , instead, a mixed strategy equilibrium arises. When the bank does not guess




(phR−B)x probability to be dealing with a good type,
given that a good type is entering with probability 1 and a bad type randomizes. Notice that
α>αbecause with the new state aid system the bank’s incentive to ﬁnance directly a ﬁrm are
changed. Indeed, the proportion of good types must be higher in order to have direct ﬁnancing,
since the bank may now ﬁnd it convenient to condition the ﬁnancing decision on the subsidy
instead of ﬁnancing directly the ﬁrm. Under this perspective, the new aid scheme may crowd out
investment.11 The equilibrium strategies are the following:
11In particular, for the bank to be indiﬀerent between F and FG an higher probability of facing a good type
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α((1 − γ)(R − T − B)) − γαx
(1 − α)T − γ(1 − α)(T − x)
η00 =
S(1 − (1 − si)γ) − γB(1 − si)
(1 − γ)(1 − si)(S + B)
ηfg =1 − η00
ηfg being the probability attached by the bank to FG.N o t i c e :f o rγ =0the same mixed strategy
equilibrium of the no-aid case is reached. Notice moreover that when γ raises, σ00
b goes down since
α increases together with γ. Paradoxically, if the probability of receiving a subsidy is increased,
the likelihood of entry of a bad type is decreased. That happens because by increasing γ, FG
becomes more convenient for the bank with respect to F. It turns out that entry for a bad guy
is riskier. More generally speaking, we can state that this aid scheme reduces the probability of
entry of a bad type when si >s . The total eﬀect on welfare of this aid system with respect to
the previous one is then twofold: ﬁrst, a good ﬁrm recognized to be such now does not receive
the subsidy and, second, the ineﬃciencies due to funding of a low quality project are reduced, as
it is more unlikely that a bad type enters the market for innovation.
Given the above equilibrium strategies, the expected total welfare can be shown to be:
E(W)=αsi(B+S)+
α((R − B − siT)γx+ siT(1 − γ)(R − B − T))
T(1 − γ)+γx
−
αγ(R − B)(B(1 − si) − siS)
(S + B)(γx+( 1− γ)T)
x
(2.17)
if we substitute for x and take the derivative with respect to si, we get:
∂E(W)
∂si
= α(R − I) > 0 (2.18)
It turns out that, independently of γ, expected welfare is increasing in si. The intuition for
this result is easy to guess: on the one hand, the subsidy reduces a bad type’s probability to
enter. On the other hand, the subsidy scheme costs less the higher is si since the subsidy is
when the type is unknown is required. To clarify, think about a game where a player j has to choose among two
options: a and b which yield respectively 1 and 0 if status A is realized and −1 and k if status B is realized. Initially
k =0 ,s of o rj to be indiﬀerent between a and b it is necessary that P(A)=
1
2. Suppose then that k increases:
k =1 .F o rj to be indiﬀerent between a and b it is now necessary that P(A)=
2
3. So: since in this aid scheme the
value of b (FG) is increased it is now necessary that the probabilityo fb e i n ga tt h el e f tn o d eo ft h ei n f o s e ti si t s e l f
i n c r e a s e di no r d e rf o rt h eb a n kt ob ei n d i ﬀerent between F and FG.T h a ti sw h yα>α .
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strictly correlated with its necessity. When the ﬁrm has a high si it is unlikely that the subsidy
will be needed by the ﬁrm (indeed, η00, the probability of being directly ﬁnanced by the bank
when it is unable to guess the type, is increasing in si). However, for the mere fact of existing,
the aid scheme changes the ﬁrm’s entry strategy and the positive impact on welfare is higher the
bigger is si. In addition notice that, contrary to what happens with the ﬁrst aid scheme, even if a
big/experienced ﬁrm (si > s) is by mistake entitled to get the subsidy, it does not get it, because
w h e nt h eb a n ki ss u r et ob ed e a l i n gw i t hag o o dﬁr m( t h i si sa l w a y st r u ew h e nsi > s because
project submission is not proﬁtable for bad ﬁrms) it prefers not to run the risk of not ﬁnancing
it by conditioning the ﬁnancing decision on the uncertain subsidization.
Proposition 2.4 If the introduction of the ex-post aid scheme has a positive impact on welfare,
this impact is higher the bigger or the more experienced is the ﬁrm.
Proof. It follows directly from (2.18)
Figure 2 compares the diﬀerent level of welfare within the three diﬀerent analyzed settings:
without aid (A), with the ex-ante aid scheme (B), with the ex-post aid scheme (C). As it can be
noticed, the ex-ante aid scheme is associated with higher levels of welfare when the informative
power of the ﬁrm is very low (si < e s) whilst the ex-post aid scheme is associated with higher level













ﬁgure 2 - Welfare levels: no subsidy (A); ex-ante aid scheme (B); ex-post aid scheme (C)
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2.3 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of a state aid system aimed at stimulating
innovation in the presence of imperfect ﬁnancial market. To that intent a simple theoretical
framework is proposed. The model adopted in Section 2 extends the basic model of Holmström
and Tirole (1997) introducing asymmetries among ﬁrms by considering the amount of information
available to banks, which diﬀers from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. When assessing the quality of a ﬁrm proposing
a project, banks may consider that the available information is not enough for funding, because
they are not able to guess the actual probability of success of the proposed project. In the model
it is assumed that this happens more often with small or young ﬁrms, since they usually lack of
the information required by banks to that purpose.
In particular, when the proportion of ﬁrms with high probability of success is low (in the
model: α<α ) and the likelihood that the bank has enough information to guess the ﬁrm’s
probability of success is low (si < s), innovation is below its potential because a proﬁtable and
potentially successful project is not ﬁnanced with probability 1 as a consequence of imperfect
information.
When innovation is below its potential, it can be increased through the implementation of an
aid scheme.
In the simplest setting, the aid is granted at the beginning of the game and it is supposed to
reduce the total amount of investment in a way such that the bank is induced to ﬁnance a ﬁrm
the type of which is not able to guess.
The model shows that, within this setting, a state aid policy which targets only small or
young ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms with si < e s) maximizes total welfare if the proportion of ﬁrms with high
probability of success is suﬃc i e n t l yh i g h( α>e α). That happens because, even if it is more costly
from the social point of view to grant a subsidy to a small/young ﬁrm (i.e. the likelihood of
subsidizing a ﬁrm with a low probability of succ e s si sh i g h e r ,g i v e nt h a tb a n k sﬁnd more diﬃcult
to assess small/young ﬁrms’ projects’ quality), the positive impact of the subsidy on innovation
more than oﬀset that cost, since the aid targets ﬁrms which more likely strictly need it in order to
be able to innovate. The model moreover shows that the optimal state aid policy always implies a
proportion of ﬁrms which do not get the aid even if they would need it in order to innovate. This
proportion depends positively on the total cost of investment and negatively on the proportion
of ﬁr m sw i t hh i g hi n n o v a t i v ea b i l i t yi nt h ee c o n o m y .
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The ex-ante aid scheme in which the aid is granted before the ﬁrm asks a loan to the bank
entails a positive probability that the aid is granted to a ﬁrm which does not strictly need it in
order to be funded. Indeed, since the aid is granted at the beginning of the game regardless of the
type of the ﬁrm (which is assumed to be unknown to the government), a ﬁrm which has a high
probability of success still gets the aid even if its proﬁtability is recognized by the bank and thus
would have been ﬁnanced anyway. The relative magnitude of this ineﬃciency obviously increases
with the size/experience of the ﬁrm, since the bigger/experienced is the ﬁrm the less necessary
is the subsidy. In order to overcome that problem, an alternative aid scheme is proposed. In
the alternative aid scheme, a ﬁrm must ﬁrst ask the loan to the bank and then, if the bank
decides to condition the ﬁnancing decision on the (uncertain) state aid, apply for the subsidy.
The advantage of this aid scheme relies on the fact that within it the government can use the bank
as a ’ﬁlter’ in order to select the projects for which the subsidy is strictly necessary. The model
shows that this ex-post aid scheme might be preferable when ﬁrms are bigger/older than a certain
threshold (si >s ) while it is suboptimal with smaller/younger ﬁrms if compared to the ex-ante aid
scheme. As a general implication, the model provides a theoretical justiﬁcation for subsidization
to small/young ﬁrms from a welfare maximizing authority’s point of view. The idea that smaller
or younger ﬁrms should be entitled to get subsidies is usually taken for granted on the basis of
a market failure argument, which does not take into consideration the cost of implementing a
state aid system. This paper attempts to go beyond that showing that subsidizing small or young
ﬁrms increases total welfare if the average likelihood of success for ﬁrms in the economy is not
too small.
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2.A Appendix
Proof n 1. We need to show that welfare is lower with respect to the ﬁrst aid scheme when




i)=siB +( 1− si)(γB − (1 − γ)S)
E(Rb
i)=−siS +( 1− si)(γB − (1 − γ)S)
E(Rl)=α(si(R − B − T)+( 1− si)γ(R − B − (T − x))) − (1 − α)(1 − si)γ(T − x)
E(W2)=γx(1 − si) − S + B(1 − si)(γ − αγ) − I(si(α − γ)+γ)+Rα(γ +( 1− γ)si)+
−λγ(1 − si)x
where E(W2) is the expected welfare with the second aid scheme. Setting q = γ, we get that











γsi(T − α(R − B))
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3.1 Introduction
Suppose you are an entrepreneur. Your company is in construction and your customers are mainly
local governments which put works out to tender. Participating to a public procurement auction
is costly: you need to have a complete knowledge of the kind of work you are supposed to do,
to write a project proposal which complies with the technical requirements deﬁned by the tender
and to be registered in the speciﬁc book of the authorized companies. Then you need to build
your bidding strategy by balancing winning probability and expected costs. Eventually, you may
apply to the auction, submit your bid and, hopefully, win with a certain probability.
Imagine that yours is one of the few companies which know that the tender is taking place.
That is: the contracting agency did not advertise the tender (you may have some friends who work
for the agency and you got the information from them). When deciding whether to participate
or not to the auction, you will take into account that the number of competitors that you will
face is small and that the likelihood of submitting a winning bid is high. You might even think
that it will be easier to coordinate (tacitly or not) with your competitors, in order to get a better
deal from the contracting authority. As a result, your incentives to join the auction are likely to
be very high.
Now, suppose that one day you open your favorite national newspaper and realize that another
contracting authority is advertising a similar tender. If the agency did not advertise the tender,
surely you would not have participated: you actually would not have any clue that the tender
was taking place. However, your incentives to participate are now smaller: since the tender
is advertised on a national newspaper, you expect competition to be harsh. You might then
decide not to participate because your expected proﬁts (which are a function of the probability
of submitting a winning bid) are not enough to oﬀset your participation costs.
From the contracting authority point of view, thus, it is not clear whether increasing the
advertising eﬀort is always worthy doing. In other words, increasing the number of potential
participants has an ambiguous eﬀect on auctions’ outcome.
This issue is relevant. Public procurement contracts in Member States amount to a huge slice
of the European Union’s GDP: 16% in 2002. Member States as well as the European Commission
are pushing to increase the use of advertising policies by the contracting authorities. For instance,
Directive 2004/18/CE stresses the importance of an extensive use of advertisement in order to let
European ﬁrms be able to participate to all the tenders taking place within the European Union.
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Likewise, the European Commission promotes online advertising of public contracts EU-wide in
order to increase transparency and to enhance public procurement auctions’ eﬃciency level.
This paper uses a unique dataset to address that issue and empirically test the impact of
publicity on competition in public procurement auctions.
Assessing the beneﬁts of publicity in public procurement auctions, requires going through the
following steps: ﬁrst, one should ask whether and to which extent advertising rises competition;
second, one should ask how competition, as it is inﬂuenced by advertising policy, decreases the
price to be paid by the auctioneer to the winning bidder i.e. it increases the auctioneer’s rent.
As for the ﬁr s tp o i n t ,n o t i c et h a taﬁrm can join an auction only if the ﬁrm knows that the
auction exists. Since participating to an auction requires to sustain some ﬁxed cost, however, a
ﬁrm might decide not to participate if it thinks that competition will be too harsh.
As for the second point, it is well accepted that an increase in the number of participants
increases the auctioneer’s rent: ﬁrms are pushed to bid more aggressively if the number of bids is
increased.1 Beyond that, advertising can aﬀect participants’ characteristics, by stimulating entry
of outsiders (i.e. those ﬁrms which are located outside the region where the auction is taking
place). Outsiders might decrease the likelihood of collusion, since local ﬁrms ﬁnd it more diﬃcult
to coordinate, having fewer contacts with competitors.2 Outsiders can even have a diﬀerent cost
structure: ﬁrms located far from the auctioneer participate only if their transport costs are very
low or if they are not able to compete in their local market. On the other hand, publicity may
discourage entry of local ﬁrms since, ceteris paribus, the incentive to participate is lower when
more ﬁrms are applying. Local ﬁrms may have a deeper knowledge of the procedure implemented
and of the work’s features and they can exploit scale economies by dealing with the same authority
more than once. It is not clear, then, what is the magnitude of the eﬀect on auctioneer’s rent
which is associated to publicity and its selective eﬀect rather than to its direct eﬀect on the
number of participants. Figure 1 oﬀers a graphical intuition of those simple concepts.
Our paper aims at identifying the total eﬀect of publicity on the number of actual bidders
and on the auctioneer’s rent.
Based on the recent theoretical contributions of Levin and Smith (1994) and Menezes and
Monteiro (1996, 2000) we discuss the link between publicity and competition in a stylized model
of endogenous entry in auctions where entry is costly and advertising tenders decreases ﬁrms’
1See, for example, Brannman et al. (1987).
2See Compte et al. (2005).
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search costs. Both Levin and Smith and Menezes and Monteiro consider a mechanism by which
ﬁrms decide whether or not to participate to an auction. They diﬀer, though, in the timing
dimension of their models: in Levin and Smith ﬁrms incur a ﬁxed cost of entry before seeing their
values for the object while in Menezes and Monteiro ﬁrms learn their values prior to incurring
bid preparation costs. Their conclusions are thus diﬀerent: Levin and Smith suggest that the
seller should not limit entry through a restriction policy (e.g. an entry fee) while Menezes and
Monteiro ﬁnd that entry fees may be optimal for the seller since they help to screen low valuation
bidders when increased competition reduces the seller’s expected revenue. Our model follows the
one used by Menezes and Monteiro and integrates it with the possibility for the seller to advertise
the tender.
From an empirical point of view, the eﬀect of advertising tenders on competition has never
been directly tested. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) use a structural analysis to test the model of
Levin and Smith with a dataset of E-Bay coin auctions. They ﬁnd that the expectation of one
additional bidder decreases bids by 3.2% in a representative auction. In addition, they ﬁnd that
the value of the object is among the main determinants of entry. They do not consider advertising,
though. The choice of advertising an auction may be seen as the choice between choosing a
mechanism which allows for free entry or restricts it. Lundberg (2005) investigates empirically
the choice of procurement procedure in public auctions in Sweden where the contracting entity
may choose one among several available mechanisms which are linked with diﬀerent restrictions
on entry. Her (descriptive) results do not show any signiﬁcant impact from contract speciﬁcations
and municipality characteristics on the probability that the contracting authority does not restrict
entry.
Our database contains data on public procurement ﬁrst price sealed bid auctions which took
place in Tuscany (Italy) between 2000 and 2006. The database includes information on the
auctioneers and their advertisement policy, on the type of work which is put out to tender, on
bidding behavior and on the winning ﬁrms. The dataset is informative on the question under
study because it keeps track of detailed information on all the public procurement auctions with a
value greater than 150,000 euros and, in particular, because it oﬀers a unique quasi-experimental
setting to analyze the eﬀect of publicity on competition. The Italian law prescribes that every
public procurement auction should be advertised at 3 diﬀerent publicity levels on the basis of
their starting value. A Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) can then be used to compare the
outcomes of auctions with starting value immediately above or below each discontinuity threshold.
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Auctions above and below the thresholds have diﬀerent publicity levels, but should otherwise be
identical in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics determining the outcome of
interest, which in our case is the number of bidders and the winning rebate.
Using this source of identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀect, we show that an increase of publicity
determines an increase in the average number of bidders of 8.3 with respect to a benchmark
average of 30 and an increase in the average rebates of 1.5% with respect to a benchmark average
of 13%.
We further analyze auctions’ outcomes deeper. In particular, we ask whether publicity has an
impact on the nature of the winner and whether a relationship between competition in auctions
and works’ accomplishment exists. As for the ﬁrst question, we ﬁnd that publicity signiﬁcantly
raises the probability that the winner is located outside the region where the auction takes place
and the probability that the winner is a group of ﬁrms rather than a single one. As for the second
question, notice that it might well be that an increase in the number of participants encourages
ﬁrms to over-bid when the auction takes place and then to reduce the quality of the works after
having won the auction. Using duration analysis models with right censoring, we report evidence
of a negative and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between auctions’ level of competition and
the time it takes to the winner to ﬁnish the tendered works.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the theoretical
model. Section 3 describes the institutional framework; Section 4 reports the empirical analysis.
Conclusions and policy implications are discussed in Section 5.
3.2 The Model
We model a public procurement auction as a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction where the number
of bidders is endogenously determined in a way which is very similar to Menezes and Monteiro
(MM) (2000). A single contract is put out to tender. The auctioneer is assumed to have zero
reserve price. Firms bid a rebate b on the auction’s starting amount for which they would be
willing to do the works. Bidder i knows her own value vi of the contract and the distribution
F(vi),∀i 6= j of other n bidders’ values. F(.) is continuous with support [0,v]. Participating to
the auction requires sustaining a ﬁxed cost c plus some searching cost δ which for the moment
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are assumed to be 0.3 Each bidder decides whether to submit a bid before knowing how many
competitors will participate to the auction. Assuming that everyone else except i use the same
strategy b,w eh a v et h a ti’s expected proﬁts are:





where vρ solves vρF(vρ)n−1 − c a n di ti ss u c ht h a tπi(vρ,b ∗)=0i.e. vρ is the cut-oﬀ value when
all bidders use the same equilibrium strategy b∗.4 The optimal bidding strategy which maximizes








Equation (3.1) is crucial. It tells us that increasing the number of potential participants has two
opposite eﬀects on the optimal bidding strategy. On the one hand, since the cut-oﬀ value vρ value
is increasing in n (provided that c<1), it decreases the probability that a player i participates to
the auction (since that happens only if vi >v ρ). On the other hand, it increases the equilibrium
bid, since participating players take into account that, in equilibrium, other bidders participate
only if their value is greater than vρ.






MM then show that the revenue generated by a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction is equivalent to that
g e n e r a t e db yas e c o n dp r i c es e a l e db i da u c t i o nw h e nt h en u m b e ro fp o t e n t i a lp l a y e r si sﬁxed and
participation is endogenous. Thus R can be rewritten as follows:




Now suppose that the auctioneer is able to control the number of participants in order to maximize
her revenue. MM uses a variable δ ∈ (−c,1 − c) which represents an entry fee (if positive) or a
subsidy (if negative). In our context, δ represents ﬁrms’ searching cost, which are assumed to be
decreasing in the level of publicity. Let us introduce a new continuous variable p ∈ [0,δ] which is
directly correlated with the auctioneer’s advertising eﬀort. Let us assume that a marginal increase
3You may well think about c as the cost of preparing a project and submit a bid, while δ is the cost of looking
around for existing tenders.
4Menezes and Monteiro show that such strategy exists. Notice that for any c<1, v
0
ρ(n) < 0.
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in p is translated in an equivalent reduction in δ at a cost
p2
2 λz,w h e r ez is the advertising cost
(e.g. the cost of publishing the tender on a national newspaper) and λ is the shadow cost of
public expenditure.
Thus, total revenue can be maximized maximizing the following expression:















w h i c hi m p l i c i t l yd e ﬁnes the optimal level of publicity p∗.
Equation (3.2) has a simple and powerful implication which motivates our empirical analysis:
the optimal level of publicity may be lower than its maximum possible level even if its cost is zero
i.e. z =0; p∗ = δ. In other words, it might be optimal for the auctioneer not to increase the
number of potential bidders in order to increase its revenue, even it would not spend anything to
do so. The intuition comes directly from equation (3.1). Indeed, to show that this is the case, it
is suﬃcient to ﬁnd at least one case in which the optimal level of δ is positive notwithstanding
z =0 . The following example illustrates this possibility.5
Example 3.1 Assume that the n players are represented by random draws from the distribution
F(x)=x4 and p = z =0 . Expected revenue is then:
R =4 n(n − 1)
Ã
1 − c − δ
4n − 3
−





Assume further that n =2 0and c =0 .1. It turns out that the level of δ which maximizes R is
positive and it is δ =0 .031.
We can then state the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 Independently of its cost, the optimal level of publicity can be below its maxi-
mum possible level.
Proof. It follows directly from example 3.1.
5Example 1 is similar to Example 4 of MM.
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3.2.1 An intuitive IO model
The result stated in Proposition 3.1 is not necessarily limited to the context of auctions. Indeed,
suppose you have a pool of 2 ﬁrms which may enter a market where demand is linear and given
by Q =1− P.W h e n t w o o r m o r e ﬁrms are in the market they compete à la Cournot. Each
ﬁrm has marginal cost c = 1
2 and has to sustain a ﬁxed (sunk) cost K< 1
36 in order to enter the
market
In a two-stages game where ﬁrms ﬁrst decide whether to enter the market and then they set
their output, the equilibrium is the following. Each ﬁrm enters the market and produces q = 1
6
making proﬁts π = 1
36 −K>0. Total quantity produced is then Q = 1
3.W e l f a r ei sW = 1
9 −2K.
Now suppose that the pool of potential entrants is enlarged. This might be the outcome of
an advertisement policy, in our context. The new pool is made of the two ﬁr m sp l u sa n o t h e rﬁrm




Notice that under these conditions only j enters the market. If even only one of the ineﬃcient




The equilibrium with the new pool of ﬁr m si st h u st h ef o l l o w i n g :j is the unique ﬁrm in the
market. It produces qj = Q =
1−cj





− K.T h u s , i f cj
is suﬃciently high (cj > 1
3) the advertisement policy which has enlarged the pool of potential
entrant ﬁrms had a negative impact on total competition in the market (now there is just one ﬁrm
instead of two) and on consumer surplus (now the quantity produced is lower). Notice, however,






− K which is always
greater than W in the considered interval of K and cj. Total welfare is increased because as only
one ﬁrm enters the market a duplication of the ﬁxed cost K is prevented. Consider, though, that
in our context the auctioneer maximizes her revenue (which might be represented by consumer
surplus) and not total social welfare.6
We now introduce the institutional framework from which our data are drawn and then
proceed with the empirical analysis motivated by Proposition 3.1
6Indeed, suppose that the auctioneer is a municipality. If her objective was total welfare she would restrict the
auction to ﬁrms which belongs to the local area. A possibility which is ruled out by law.
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3.3 Institutional Framework
We base this empirical analysis on novel and detailed administrative data from the Italian Author-
ity for Surveillance of Public Procurement (Autorita’ Vigilanza Lavori Pubblici, AVLP), which
collects data on each single public procurement auction with starting value greater or equal than
150,000 euros which takes place in Italy. Tables 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics relative to
the sample. Our database amounts to 5,735 auctions, a vast majority of which (85%) are auctions
with direct participation of ﬁrms (pubblico incanto) while in the remaining ones participation is
subject to auctioneer’s invitation after ﬁrms have applied for it (licitazione privata). The two
types of auctions do not show any substantial diﬀerence, though. The contracting authorities are
mainly municipalities (52% of the sample). The rest of the sample is made of tenders invited by
provinces (11%), health-care public bodies (ASL) and other public bodies or corporations.
The contracting authority must deﬁne all the details concerning the works that have to be
carried on by the winning ﬁrm, including the starting price that the auctioneer would pay to the
winner if only one ﬁrm participates to the auction. On average, the auctions’ starting value in the
sample amounts to 974 thousands of euros though the standard deviation is rather high: indeed,
the median starting value is 363 thousands of euros. Notice, moreover, that most of the auctions
are done to contract out road’s constructions (30.5% of the total) which include maintenance and
reconstruction and whatever is necessary to guarantee truckage, by rail and air transport. The
contracting authority must deﬁne the requirements which have to be satisﬁed by bidders as well.
Bidders have to be certiﬁed that they are able to carry on the works of that particular size and in
that particular sector i.e. they need to be audited by an attestor society (SOA, società organismo
di attestazione) and be registered for the required category in a speciﬁc book. So, for example, if
the construction of a road is put out to tender and the contracting authority estimates that the
amount of qualiﬁed work that has to be done is valued 700,000 euros, the required SOA category
will likely be: 3-OG3, where 3 refers to the size of the works and OG3 to the category "road
constructions". The size requirements are mainly based on ﬁrms’ turnover.7
All the considered auctions are ﬁrst-price sealed-bid: ﬁrms bid the price for which they are
willing to do the works in the form of a percentage reduction - rebate - with respect to the
auction’s starting value. In all the auctions which are included in our database the selection
7Notice that the required SOA category is not a direct function of the auction’s starting value. Indeed, the
works to be done are usually a complex combination of several expertises and hence the required SOA categories
may be more than once. For our analysis we consider just the primary required SOA category.
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criterion for the winner is uniquely based on the rebate i.e. the technical component of ﬁrms’
oﬀer plays no role (provided that the winner will satisfy some minimum quality standards which
are set by the contracting authority).8 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of our data. In the
sample, it is observed that the average number of ﬁrms participating to the auction is 30 with
standard deviation 30,a n dam e d i a no f21. The winning rebate is on average 13.4% with standard
deviation 5.9, which is very close to the median value (14.1%). In addition, to explore the nature
of competition three main indicators are considered: the probability of a winner coming from
outside the region, the legal nature of the winner, and the indication of whether the winner is a
member of a group of ﬁrms. The probability that the winner is coming from outside the region
is 0.48 with standard deviation 0.5;o n l y11% of the winners are public companies with standard
deviation 0.31 and 22% of the winners are member of a group of ﬁrms (standard deviation 0.41).
Concerning tenders’ advertisement, until July 2006, auctions were classiﬁed by the law according
to their starting value as it is illustrated by the following table, where the ﬁrst column reports
y, the auction’s starting value (in hundreds of thousands), the second column reports the level
of publicity required by the law and the third column reports an approximation of the average
potential population which can be reached through the correspondent level of publicity.9
8The winning rebate is not necessarily the highest bidden. In order to prevent ﬁrms from over-bidding (i.e.
bidding a price which does not allow to recoup works’ expenses) a complex (and criticizable) mechanism is imple-
mented. According to this rule, all the bids which exceed the average bid by more than the average deviation from
the average are automatically excluded. Bidders thus have to guess which will be this ’anomaly threshold’ (as it is
called) and try to place a bid below it.
9Notice that the level of publicity (the treatment in our model) is an ordinal variable where the ﬁrst (lowest)
level is associated with the smallest set of potential participants (proxied by the population).
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y publicity average potential population
y ≥ 50 SRD
EU - Oﬃcial Journal (GUCE)
Italian Oﬃcial Journal (GURI)
National Newspapers (at least 2)





10€ ≤ y<50 SRD
Italian Oﬃcial Journal (GURI)
National Newspapers (at least 2)





Regional Oﬃcial Journal (BUR)
Provincial Newspapers (at least 2)
3,500,000
360,000
y<5€ Notice Board 12,500
table A
According to Table A, auctions with starting value below 500 thousands of euros have to
be published on the contracting authority’s notice board. This is considered the least amount
of possible publicity, since only ﬁrms which have direct access to the auctioneer’s premises or
have direct contact with its staﬀ may get information on the tender. The cost of publishing on
the notice board is zero. The second interval goes from 500 to 1,000 thousands and it identiﬁes
those auctions for which the compulsory level of publicity is local i.e. those tenders that must be
advertised in at least two newspapers spread all over the province where the works should be made
a n di nt h eo ﬃcial regional journal (Bollettino Uﬃciale Regionale, BUR). Publishing on BUR is
very cheap: an average tender should not cost more than 500 euros. Provincial newspapers are
cheap as well, since advertisement’s price is proportional to the number of printed copies. The
third level of publicity is national and concerns those tenders with starting values above 1,000
thousands of euros and below the community threshold (5,000 thousands of SDR, special drawing
rights10). These tenders must be published on two national and two regional newspapers and
on the national oﬃcial journal (Gazzetta Uﬃciale della Repubblica Italiana, GURI). The average
cost for publishing on a national newspaper is about 800 euros (somewhat less for a regional
newspaper). GURI, though, is very expensive: publishing a tender’s abstract may cost around
7-8 thousands of euros. Finally, the maximum amount of publicity is enforced when tenders’
10At the time of writing, 5,000,000 SDR were equivalent to 6,771,500 euros.
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starting value is above the community threshold. In that case the contracting authority must
also advertise on the European oﬃcial journal (Gazzetta Uﬃciale Comunità Europea, GUCE)
in addition to the obligations deﬁned for the tenders belonging to the previous group. Notice,
however, that publishing on GUCE is free of charge, so no additional cost is sustained by the
contracting authorities. From July 2006, Law Dlgs 163/2006 removes the thresholds and forces
the contracting authorities to publish on GURI at a national newspaper level, regardless of the
auction’s starting value (if it is greater than 150,000 euros). This paper may then provide a way
to measure the impact of the law reform. In our sample, 88% of the tenders were published on
the contracting authority’s notice board, 20% on the Tuscan BUR and about 18% on the GURI.
On the other hand, the average number of newspapers on which the advertisement of the tender
appeared is: 0.187 for provincial newspapers, 0.493 for regional newspapers and 0.583 for national
newspapers. From a more general perspective we can conclude that the sample show a suﬃciently
large variation in the data leaving the possibility for the econometric analysis which is illustrated
in the following section.
3.4 The Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Identiﬁcation strategy
Contracting authorities which maximize the auctioneer’s revenue implement diﬀerent advertise-
ment strategies with respect to contracting authorities which pursue other aims, such as maximize
political rent through collusion with local ﬁrms. Because of this endogeneity problem, we expect
O L St ob eu n a b l et og i v eu su n b i a s e de s t i m a t i o no f the model. To disentangle the causality rela-
tionship between publicity and auction’s outcome we thus implement a more reﬁned technique:
the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). In Section 3 we saw that an higher level of publicity
(the treatment) is assigned to auctions if an observed covariate, the starting value of the auction,
crosses a known threshold.
We are aware that using exogenous thresholds which are identiﬁe db yt h el a wi sn o te q u i v a l e n t
to a controlled experiment because individuals’ assignment might be not completely random. Lee
(2007), however, shows that in these cases the RDD can nevertheless identify impact estimates
that share the same validity as those resulting from a randomized experiment.
As in the summary guide to practice by Imbens and Lemieux (2007), to implement the RDD
to our analysis we go through the following steps:
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1. Inspect the Graphical Analysis.
2. Estimate the treatment eﬀect using TSLS where standard errors can be computed using
the usual (robust) TSLS standard errors.
3. Assess the Robustness and Identiﬁcation assumptions by looking at possible jumps in the
value of pre-treatment variables at the cut-oﬀ point.
In this section we discuss the theory and the assumptions required to implement the RDD.
We deﬁne yj as the j-th threshold in the auctions’ starting value which determines a discontinuity
point in the amount of publicity, as established by the law. The j − th discontinuity point
separates the j and j+1 levels in publicity assignment imposed to contractors. We call these levels
’publicity brackets’. We aim at identifying the causal eﬀect of publicity on auctions’ outcomes by
focusing on auctions in the neighborhood of those discontinuity points. Let Y be the auction’s
real starting value (the ’running variable’), and Z be the level of theoretical publicity that the
contractor should implement under perfect compliance to the assignment rule. We denote by P
the level of publicity actually observed in the auction. P may diﬀer from its theoretical level if
the contracting authority does not comply with the law assignment: indeed, it is very unlikely
that a contracting authority would be punished from AVLP if P diﬀers from Z.11 Finally let
C represent the outcome of auctions indicating the level of competition. In the analysis we
alternatively consider C to be the number of bidders or the winning rebate. Let Cl and Ch being
the values of C respectively below and above the generic discontinuity point j. To identify the
causal eﬀect of publicity on competition we need the following continuity assumptions:
E{Cl|Y = y+
j } = E{Cl|Y = y−
j } (3.3)
E{Pl|Y = y+




j represent the left and the right limits of the starting value of the auction. As
in Hahn et al. (2001) and Garibaldi et al. (2007), under the continuity conditions, for an auction
in a neighborhood of the cut-oﬀ point the mean eﬀect of being assigned to a higher theoretical
publicity bracket Z = h (instead of the lower one Z = l) on the actual publicity level P and on
the competition level C are:
11We then use a version of RDD called Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design, which is used when there is not
perfect compliance by individuals.
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E{P|y+
j } − E{P|y−
j }. (3.5)
E{C|y+
j } − E{C|y−
j }. (3.6)
(3.5) and (3.6) are usually called the intention-to-treat (ITT) eﬀects.12
Following Angrist et al. (2000)’s seminal paper we interpret the ratio of the two ITT eﬀects of
expressions (3.5) and (3.6) as the causal eﬀect of P on C (of publicity on competition). This can
be done only if two more conditions are satisﬁed: the validity of the exclusion restriction and the
monotonicity condition. The exclusion restriction requires that the theoretical publicity Z aﬀects
the outcome, C, only through the observed level of publicity (which is reasonable in our context).
The monotonicity condition requires that no auction is induced to display a lower (higher) actual
level of publicity if the theoretical publicity is exogenously moved from l to h (from h to l).
If the three assumptions are satisﬁed, then the ratio:
Π(yj)=
E{C|y+
j } − E{C|y−
j }
E{P|y+
j } − E{P|y−
j }
, (3.7)
identiﬁes the average eﬀect of a change in the actual level of publicity on the level of competition
at Y = yj for those who are induced to show a higher level of publicity because their theoretical
publicity increases from l to h.13
3.4.2 Graphical Analysis
We model the publicity function according to Table A which assigns diﬀerent levels of publicity
according to the auction’s starting value. We thus have:
P =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
P Geographical Level Running V ariable
0 Local if 1.5 ≤ Y< 5
1 Regional if 5 ≤ Y< 10
2 National if 10 ≤ Y< Y ∗
3 EU if Y ≥ Y ∗
12To keep the notation as simple as possible, we omit time subscripts. In the empirical analysis we consider all
the relations conditioned on time periods.
13For details on the average nature of the eﬀect see Garibaldi et al. (2007).
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Where Y is the starting value of the auction expressed in 100,000 euro (real value year 2000) and
Y ∗ varies across the year of analysis. Due to non perfect compliance, we construct an indicator
of theoretical publicity, which will be used as the instrument for actual publicity:
Z =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if 1.5 ≤ Y< 5
1 if 5 ≤ Y< 10
2 if 10 ≤ Y< Y ∗
3 if Y ≥ Y ∗
Under perfect compliance Z and P should coincide. Figure 2 showst h a tt h i si sn o tt h ec a s ei n
our context: the green line (which represents the actual publicity) indeed do not overlap with the
orange line (which represents the theoretical publicity).
Figure 3 represents graphically non-parametric estimates of the main variables of interest. The
two boxes on the left plot P on Y at the discontinuity thresholds 1 and 2, respectively. The other
two boxes on the right plot the number of bidders on Y for the same discontinuity points. We
estimate these locally weighted smoothing regression separately on the left and on the right of
the cut-oﬀ points. Jumps in the plots show the eﬀect of the threshold on the variable of interest
thus oﬀering a graphical interpretation of the intention-to-treat eﬀects as deﬁned by (3.5) and
(3.6). As it can be noticed, the ﬁgures show that the actual publicity is uniformly not lower than
the theoretical publicity on both discontinuities at the left of the threshold. At the right of the
threshold we observe some problems of compliance with the law on publicity but not that big to
violate the monotonicity condition required by RDD, as pointed out in Garibaldi et al. (2007).
Concerning the number of bidders, we observe a jump at the right of both cut-oﬀ points. The
mean impact of the actual publicity on competition, which is the ratio of the jump of the level
of competition and the jump of the level of actual publicity, turns out to be larger at the ﬁrst
discontinuity rather then at the second. The ﬁgures show that there is a substantial eﬀect of
publicity on competition at the right of the thresholds. The impact weakens at discontinuity 2.
We implement a graphical test on the continuity assumption following Lee (2007) to support
the identiﬁcation strategy required by our estimation technique, as in Garibaldi et al. (2007).
We proceed in two steps: ﬁrst, we plot the histograms of the auctions’ starting value around the
thresholds (see ﬁgure 4) to identify any form of manipulation of the running variable. Second,
we inspect the pre-intervention variables as deﬁned below. Figure 4 shows that the distribution
of the auctions’ starting value is right skewed. No signiﬁcant mass probability around the single
thresholds is identiﬁed, although a single peak is observable at discontinuity one. The presence
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o ft h ep e a km a yr a i s ei d e n t i ﬁcation problems. We thus further analyze that issue through the
pre-intervention variables.
We deﬁne our set of pre-intervention variables from the detailed available information. These
variables, in principle, should meet the following two conditions: they should not be aﬀected
by the publicity law, but they may depend on the same unobservables (e.g. eﬃciency/collusion
of the contractors with participants), likely to aﬀect the level of competition C. To test the
continuity condition we use the information available on the person in charge to take care of the
auction’s administrative process. In particular we plot her professional qualiﬁcation (engineer
or geometrician) against Y and we analyze the behavior of the plots around the thresholds. In
the graphical analysis we focus just on these two pre-treatment variables while in the regression
analysis we enlarge the set of information available to include several other variables. Since these
are observed before the determination of the publicity level, they can be used as pre-treatment
variables. The graphical test for the continuity assumption would suggest evidence of sorting
and lack of continuity if the plots of these indicators against Y would show a jump at the cut-
oﬀ points. Identiﬁcation would not be possible in those cases since auctions assigned to high
theoretical level of publicity Zh would be not comparable to auctions assigned to a low level of
publicity Zl with respect to unobservables relevant for the outcome C. Figure 5 shows that there
are no jumps at the ﬁrst threshold while jumps are very small at the second. Thus the graphical
analysis suggests the presence of no manipulation of the running variable Y .
In the following section we further investigates these graphical results by considering a battery
of regression based tests.
3.4.3 Regression Framework and Aggregation of the Eﬀects
Following Angrist and Lavy (1999) and Garibaldi et al. (2007), we consider the aggregate eﬀects
of publicity on competition estimating the following equation:14
C = g(Y )+βP + δX +   (3.8)
where g(Y ) is a fourth order polynomial in Y and P the observed level of publicity. To reduce
the amount of observed heterogeneity we consider three information sets which include several
14Given the size of the Tuscany sample we choose to focus on the across discontinuities average results. We plan
to focus on each single discontinuity once we will get access to the whole Italian dataset.
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covariates. We deﬁne the matrix X respectively being SMALL, MEDIUM, or LARGE. The
SMALL information set includes year indicators only, MEDIUM includes year indicators plus
the fourth order polynomial in Y , g(Y ), while LARGE includes MEDIUM plus indicators of the
nature of the auction. These are observable characteristics for both the good and the contractor:
the typology of works which are put out to tender (i.e. road constructions, educational buildings,
health-care building-units and other typologies); whether the contractor is a municipality, a
province, or the region;15 the ﬁrms’ technical requirements needed by the bidders to participate
to the auction. None of these covariates are determined by the publicity law but are clearly
correlated to the starting value of the auction and thus have to be included as controls.
We estimate via TSLS equation (3.8) and we interpret this instrumental variables estimate as
a weighted average of the RDD estimates at each discontinuity point with weights that are
function of the covariances between the actual and the theoretical publicity at the cut-oﬀ point,
cov(P,Z|Y = yj), j =1 ,2,3.
Table 3 reports the sample average of the outcome considered, the intention-to-treat, the OLS
and the TSLS-IV estimates with the (robust) standard errors for the coeﬃcients of publicity
only. The odd rows, starting from the third, report the estimates considering the three diﬀerent
information sets: SMALL, MEDIUM, and LARGE. In the table we report the analysis of the
number of bidders and the rebates based on equation (3.8) estimated over all the discontinuities.
We do not report estimates obtained separately for each discontinuity point and we focus our
discussion on the overall estimates that appear to be suﬃciently precise. Column 1 of Table 3
reports the intention-to-treat eﬀect of theoretical publicity on actual publicity. The estimates
indicate that an increase from a lower starting value bracket, say 1.5 − 5 hundreds of thousand
of euros, to an higher one, say 5 − 10 hundreds of thousand of euros, shifts the actual publicity
by 0.74 if we consider the LARGE information set, by the 0.81 if we consider the MEDIUM one,
and by 0.86 if we consider the SMALL one. We interpret these results as a lack of full treatment
compliance due to non perfect law enforcement. We believe that this problem is not such big to
invalidate the monotonicity assumption required by the RDD.
The overall intention-to-treat estimation of the theoretical publicity on both the number of
bidders and rebates (columns 2 and 5 respectively) suggests that following an increase of one unit
in the theoretical publicity, the number of bidders would increase from 6 to 9, with respect to
15There are several typologies of contractors which are excluded by the analysis. We focus on municipalities,
provinces, and regions because they represent a big fraction of the sample.
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a sample average of 30 bidders considering the diﬀerent information sets. On the other hand,
following an increase in one unit in the theoretical publicity, the winning rebate would increase
from 1 to 1.5 percentages points with respect to a sample average winning rebate of 13.4%.
The OLS regression of the number of bidders and the winning rebate on the actual publicity
suggests a positive correlation between publicity and competition (columns 3 and 6). The TSLS
estimates of the same eﬀects are 8.3 for the number of bidders and 1.5 for the winning rebate
(columns 4 and 7), once we consider the LARGE information set. In this IV estimation we use as
excluded instrument the theoretical level of publicity, Z. All the estimated results are statistically
diﬀerent from zero at 1%signiﬁcance level where standard errors are computed using the robust
formula. If we compare these coeﬃc i e n t sw i t ht h es a m p l ea v e r a g e s ,w eg e tt h a ta ni n c r e a s eo fo n e
level in publicity (for example by shifting from regional to national level) leads to a 27% increase
in the number of bidders and a 11% increase in the winning rebate. In addition, we observe a
large bias towards zero of the OLS results due to endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity (e.g.
collusion/eﬃciency of the contractors) which are removed in the Regression Discontinuity Design
analysis.
A ss h o w ni nS e c t i o n4 . 1 ,t h eR D Di d e n t i ﬁcation strategy is mainly based on the validity of the
continuity conditions. In Section 4.2 we already performed a graphical test of such assumptions.
Here, we report preliminary evidence based on regression analysis following Lee (2007), Imbens
and Lemieux (2007), and Garibaldi et al. (2007) to further test those conditions. We perform
the tests by estimating the same models as in equation (3.8) using as outcomes the set of pre-
treatment variables. As in Section 4.2, the analysis is focused on the available information on the
person in charge for the auction’s administrative process. The ﬁrst pre-treatment outcome that
we consider is an indicator of the professional qualiﬁcation. This variable can take ﬁve values: 1
if the person in charge is an engineer, 2 if she is an architect, 3 if she is a geometrician, 4 if she has
a generic qualiﬁcation, 5 in all the other cases. Table 4 reports the evidence. If the estimates of
the coeﬃcients on the actual publicity indicator using the theoretical publicity as an instrument
are statistically diﬀerent from zero, that would indicate that auctions below the threshold show
systematic diﬀerences in the profession of the person in charge compared to auctions above the
thresholds. This would suggest the possibility that in some of the auctions there was selection
around the thresholds and lack of continuity in the baseline outcomes. We ﬁnd no evidence of
selection by looking at the overall results reported in Table 4. The intention-to-treat estimates
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in the ﬁrst column indicates that a one unit increase in the publicity level is associated with a
reduction of 0.024 of the indicator of profession. This estimates is small and statistically not
diﬀerent from zero. Similar results are reported by the TSLS estimates in the last column of
t h et a b l e .W ec a nt h e r e f o r ee x c l u d et h ee x i s t e n ce of sorting around the thresholds. We further
enquire this issue by using other information on the person in charge such as: whether he/she
is a male, her age, the second letter of her name and the last number of the year of born.16
As in the ﬁrst row of Table 4, also in the other rows each coeﬃcient comes from a separate
regression. For example, the left cell of the row corresponding to the gender of the person in
charge indicates that being male reduces the amount of publicity implemented by 0.0042 and
this estimate is small and statistically not diﬀerent from zero. This is exactly what we should
ﬁnd if our identiﬁcation strategy is correct and such conclusion is conﬁrmed by the rest of the
table. In the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4 we ﬁnd no systematic diﬀerences with respect to
these proxies among auctions assigned to alternative level of theoretical publicity. Moreover, no
systematic diﬀerence emerges with respect to the actual level of publicity in the TSLS estimates,
although the actual publicity and the pre-treatment outcomes appear to be correlated in the OLS
regressions.
Table 4 supports the validity of the continuity conditions once we consider both the MEDIUM
and the LARGE information sets and thus allows us to conclude that there is no evidence of
manipulation of the running variable Y .
T h eN a t u r eo ft h eW i n n e r
As suggested in the Introduction, publicity might have a direct eﬀect on the nature of competition
through participating ﬁrms’ selection. In this paragraph we brieﬂyd e r i v es o m ei n s i g h t so nt h a t
issue by analyzing the impact of publicity on the nature of the auction’s winner. We are aware,
though, that a proper analysis would require data on the whole sample of participating ﬁrms
(winners + losers).
Table 5 reports the OLS and the IV estimates and their robust standard errors of the eﬀect
of publicity on three variables: the location of the winner, the legal identity of the winner and
whether the winner is a member of a group of several joined ﬁrms.
According to the IV estimates, an increase in the level of publicity is associated with a
positive and signiﬁcative increase by 25 percentage points, with a standard error of 0.052,o ft h e
16We obtained this information from the ﬁscal code.
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probability that the winner is located outside the region where the auction takes place. This result
is consistent with our ex-ante expectations: publicity helps contracting authorities to attract ﬁrms
which do not belong to the local area.17 No signiﬁcant impact of publicity on the probability
that the winner is a public company is observed: apparently publicity equally targets ﬁrms with
limited legal responsibility and public companies. Finally, publicity raises the likelihood that the
winner is a group of ﬁrms instead of a single one: an increase in one level of publicity is indeed
associated with an increase of 16 percentage points in the probability that the winner is a group,
with a standard error of 0.042. This might be due to the expected level of competition: when
publicity is high, ﬁrms expect a higher level of competition. A higher level of eﬃciency (reachable
through the scale economies of a group, for example) is thus needed in order to win the auction.
3.4.4 Duration Analysis
In this section we report evidence of a negative correlation between the number of participants
or the winning rebate and the duration of the works. In particular we describe the behavior of
the hazard function, h(l)=
f(s)
S(s),d e ﬁned as the (instantaneous) probability of accomplishing the
works at s given survival until s.L e t L ≥ 0 be the random variable representing the duration
of the works (expressed as the number of days between the moment in which the auction takes
place and the accomplishment of the works) and l the realized duration. F(l)=Pr[L ≤ l] is
the cumulative distribution function, while S(l)=Pr[L>l ]=1− F(l) is the survival function.
We use a duration analysis because our data are right-censored: indeed, several works are still
not accomplished at the day the Authority collected the data. Hence, for each i the observed
duration Ti = t is the minimum among the complete duration Li = l and the censored duration
Ci = c.
We ﬁrst report non parametric hazard estimates and then we add some structure to the hazard
function in order to link its behavior to auctions’ indicators of competition.
In the non parametric analysis we let di(t) be the number of works accomplished at duration
t and ri(t) be the number of works at risk of being accomplished at time t with duration t (where





17We might suppose that the likelihood of collusion among the competing ﬁr m si st h e nr e d u c e d ,s i n c ei ti sm o r e
diﬃcult to coordinate with outsiders.
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Figure 6 plots the Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimates of the survival function of the duration of the
works, by the number of bidders for road constructions in year 2000 only. From left to right, the
orange line represents the KM estimates considering all the auctions where the number of bidders
are above the median of the distribution of the number of bidders. The green line pools together
all the observations while the blue line represents auctions with the number of bidders below the
median. According to Figure 5 the survival function is always higher for auctions with number
of bidders below the median, which implies that they have a higher overall duration rate.
To add more structure to the analysis we implement a battery of parametric models and test
the statistical signiﬁcance of this ﬁnding. In the parametric models we pool together all the
available information and control for it. As in Section 4.3, we add as regressors the MEDIUM
and the LARGE information sets. We then propose a particular functional form of the hazard
that includes the observables, as it is usual in parametric analysis. The focus is on the speciﬁc
eﬀect of the number of bidders or the winning rebate on the duration of the works. We base our
analysis on the partial-likelihood approach proposed by Cox (1972).18 We report the estimates
of the ˆ β o fas e r i e so fm o d e l sa sf o l l o w :
hi(t|x,β)=h0(t)eX0β (3.11)
Table 6 reports the results of the analysis on works’ duration. Columns 1 and 2 show the
eﬀects of a shift of the number of bidders and of the winning rebate above the median of their
sample distribution respectively. Columns 3, 4 and 5 report the eﬀects of the nature of the
winner. Rows 1 and 2 of the same table refer to the MEDIUM and LARGE info sets to reduce
the observed variability due to heterogeneity. The estimated coeﬃcients are reported in the form
of ˆ β (and not as hazard ratios) with the robust standard errors in parentheses. For instance, the
ﬁrst row ˆ β =0 .31 indicates that a shift of the number of bidders above the median determines an
18We report the COX-PH model only. Results for Exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz are available on request.
Notice that this class of models requires the proportionality assumption to write the hazard function as in equation
(11). As suggested in Jenkins’ class notes (http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/teaching/degree/stephenj/ec968/), we
inspect the shape of the survival function and we observe a parallelism among them. We thus considered feasible
the implementation of the proportional hazard class of models.
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increase in the hazard of 31% (and hence a signiﬁcative reduction in the duration of the works).
This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at 1% level.
On the other hand (and rather surprisingly) no signiﬁcant eﬀect is observed for the winning
rebate. Evidence thus suggests a negative correlation between the number of bidders and the
duration of the works while no correlation with the winning rebate.
Concerning the nature of the winner, the only signiﬁcant eﬀect on the hazard rate reported
is the one of being member of a group. The estimates thus suggest that the economy of scales
associated with ﬁrms’ grouping matters in reducing the time of accomplishment. On the other
hand, it is interesting to notice that while publicity aﬀects the origin of the winner, coming from
outside the region does not impact the duration of the works (which might be interpreted as one
of the determinants of their quality).
3.5 Conclusions
Economic theory suggests that increasing the actual number of bidders in an auction has a pos-
itive eﬀect on the auctioneer’s rent. Increasing the number of potential bidders via an increase
in the level of publicity made to advertise the tender has an ambiguous eﬀect on the auction’s
outcome, though. On the one hand, a ﬁrm may be not aware that a tender is taking place if
the contracting authority does not advertise it. On the other hand, a ﬁrm might be discouraged
to participate if it observes a high level of publicity because that signals that competition in the
auction will be harsh: if the probability of recouping the participation cost is too low, the ﬁrm
might decide not to enter the competition.
Using a unique dataset on public tenders which took place in Tuscany - Italy in the period 2000
- 2006, this paper tests the eﬀects of publicity on competition in public procurement auctions.
Our empirical analysis reports evidence of a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of publicity
on the number of participants to auctions and on the winning rebate, i.e. on the auctioneer’s rent.
In the paper we ﬁrst adapt the model of Menezes and Monteiro (2000) on endogenous entry
in auctions allowing for the optimal choice of publicity and show that it can be the case that the
optimal level of publicity is not the maximal one even if publicity comes for free to the auctioneer.
That is: it might be the case that keeping the number of potential bidders smaller than what it
could be is an optimal policy, because of the trade-oﬀ illustrated above.
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Next, we apply our econometric analysis to the database collected by the Italian Authority
for Surveillance of Public Procurement.
Thanks to the Italian law on publicity for public procurement auctions, we are able to identify
the publicity rule that contractors should follow according to the auction’s starting value: the
bigger is the value of the works which are put out to tender the broader the advertisement
policy implemented by the contracting authority must be. Within this framework we implement
a Regressions Discontinuity Design (RDD) which allows us to compare auctions with similar
starting values immediately above or below each discontinuity threshold which separate diﬀerent
levels of due publicity.
By using this source of identiﬁcation, we are able to disentangle the causal eﬀect of publicity
on competition. We show that an increase in one level of publicity (for instance from local to
regional) increases the number of bidders by 8.3 with respect to a sample average of 30. That
is: it increases the number of participants by 27%. We also show that such increase in publicity
rises the winning rebate by 1.5 percentage points with respect to a sample average of 13.4%
(i.e. the winning rebate is increased by 11%). These results are supported by the tests of
the continuity conditions which we perform both graphically and within the regression analysis’
framework. We also report evidence of a negative correlation between competition and the time
to deliver the good put on auction within a duration analysis framework. Indeed, a shift of the
number of bidders above the median determines an increase in the hazard of 31% (and hence a
signiﬁcative reduction in the duration of the works). This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at 1% level. The
empirical analysis suggests that, within the context of our data, increasing the level of publicity
has a positive eﬀect on auctions’ outcomes. Indeed, it seems that the deterrence eﬀect due to an
increase in the number of potential competitors is more than oﬀset by the knowledge eﬀect due to
the fact that ﬁrms get information on tenders more easily. At this level of the analysis, however,
we cannot disentangle the positive eﬀect which is due just to the number of potential competitors
from several other eﬀects which publicity might have on the nature of competition. Indeed,
increasing the publicity level might determine a reduction of the probability of collusion (simply
because a ’maverick entry’ from outsiders become more easy) or it might attract a particular
kind of competitor which might induce local ﬁrms to bid more aggressively. The paper, however
reports some preliminary explorations on this issue suggesting that publicity aﬀects the origin of
the winner and the the probability of the winner being a group of ﬁrms rather than a single one.
We plan to address that issue with further research.
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3.A Figures and Tables
publicity # of bidders winning rebate + ?
ﬁgure 1 - The eﬀect of publicity on competition
Percentiles
mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 n
Number of Bidding Firms 30 30 3 9 21 43 70 5735
Winning rebate 13 5.9 5 11 14 16 19 5735
W i n n e r o u t s i d e t h e r e g i o n . 4 8. 5 000115735
Winner public company .11 .31 000015735
W i n n e r m e m b e r o f a g r o u p . 2 2. 4 1 000015735
N o t i c e B o a r d . 9 . 2 9 111115735
Regional Oﬃc i a l J o u r n a l . 2 1. 4 1 000015735
Italian Oﬃc i a l J o u r n a l . 1 9. 3 9 000015735
N u m b e r o f P r o v i n c e N e w s p a p e r s . 1 9. 5 6 000015735
N u m b e r o f R e g i o n a l N e w s p a p e r s . 5 . 8 4 000125735
N u m b e r o f N a t i o n a l N e w s p a p e r s . 5 9. 9 000125735
Euro (in 100000) 9.6 42 1.8 2.3 3.7 7.5 17 5735
T h e C o n t r a c t o r i s a M u n i c i p a l i t y . 5 2. 5 001115735
T h e C o n t r a c t o r i s a P r o v i n c e . 1 1. 3 2 000015735
table 1 - Descriptive Statistics
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Roads Education Culture Others
Number of Bidding Firms 42.5 23.4 29 24.7
Winning rebate 12.9 13.6 14.1 13.5
Winner outside the region .406 .5 .517 .524
Winner public company .115 .0534 .111 .101
Winner member of a group .181 .192 .255 .224
Notice Board .931 .902 .899 .888
Regional Oﬃcial Journal .139 .197 .241 .251
Italian Oﬃcial Journal .129 .146 .198 .246
Number of Province Newspapers .176 .183 .215 .201
Number of Regional Newspapers .373 .421 .532 .606
Number of National Newspapers .436 .564 .67 .687
Euro (in 100000) 10.5 6.39 8.66 10.1
The contractor is a Municipality .588 .684 .619 .416
The contractor is a Province .209 .212 .0613 .0367
Fraction of the total 29.9 13.7 8.82 47.6
table 2 - Descriptive statistics by object’s typology
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ﬁgure 3 - Intention-to-treat eﬀects
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ﬁgure 5 - Continuity conditions and sorting: the profession of the person in charge
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Method OLS-ITT OLS-ITT OLS IV-LATE OLS-ITT OLS IV-LATE
Outcome Publicity Number of Number of Number of Winning Winning Winning
Bidders Bidders Bidders Rebate Rebate Rebate
Treatment Publicity Publicity Publicity Publicity
Instrument Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ.
Mean-Out. .62 . 30 . . 13 .
(sd) .86 . 30 . . 5.9 .
SMALL .86 9 6.8 11 1.5 1.6 1.8
(se) .01 .54 .5 .65 .1 .1 .12
MEDIUM .81 13 6.7 17 .94 1.1 1.3
(se) .01 .78 .66 1 .17 .13 .22
LARGE .74 6 2.3 8.3 1 1 1.5
(se) .02 1.1 .68 1.6 .22 .14 .3
N 5500 5734 5500 5500 5734 5500 5500
table 3 - Regression discontinuity estimates of the eﬀect of publicity on competition
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Method OLS-ITT OLS-ITT OLS OLS IV-LATE IV-LATE
Treatment Publicity Publicity Publicity Publicity
Instrument Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ.
Info. Set MEDIUM LARGE MEDIUM LARGE MEDIUM LARGE
Prof. type -.024 .053 .09 .11 -.0021 .09
(sd) .034 .056 .029 .034 .042 .076
Male -.0042 -.018 -.011 -.015 -.0045 -.023
(se) .0081 .013 .0066 .0076 .01 .018
Age .45 .26 .76 .6 .68 .4
(se) .2 .31 .16 .19 .25 .43
Sec.Let.Name .15 -.15 .21 .049 .19 -.27
(se) .14 .21 .11 .13 .17 .29
Last Num.Year of Born -.094 .083 -.017 .11 -.14 .13
(se) .074 .12 .06 .071 .093 .16
table 4 - Tests for the presence of sorting and for the continuity conditions
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Method OLS IV-LATE OLS IV-LATE OLS IV-LATE
Outcome Winner Winner Winner Winner Winner Winner
Outside Outside Public Public Member Member
Region Region Company Company of a Group of a Group
Treatment Publicity Publicity Publicity Publicity Publicity Publicity
Instrument Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ. Theo.Publ.
Mean-Outcome .48 . .099 . .21 .
(sd) .5 . .3 . .41 .
SMALL .1 .23 .054 .094 .076 .16
(se) .0091 .015 .0074 .01 .0087 .013
MEDIUM .046 .3 .01 .019 .033 .2
(se) .012 .034 .0084 .02 .011 .028
LARGE .0041 .25 .011 .045 .0048 .16
(se) .012 .052 .0088 .032 .012 .042
N 4881 4881 5350 5350 5350 5350
table 5 - Regression discontinuity estimates of the eﬀect of publicity on the nature of the winner
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ﬁgure 6 - Competition and duration: kaplain-meier estimates, roads in year 2000
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DOI: 10.2870/1386594 CHAPTER 3. DOES PUBLICITY AFFECT COMPETITION?
Number Winning Winner Winner Winner
of bidders rebate outside Public Member
above above region Company of a Group
median median
Info. Set
MEDIUM .31 -.026 -.082 .1 .29
(se) .04 .041 .042 .068 .044
LARGE .19 .02 -.034 .051 .31
(se) .044 .044 .043 .07 .045
N 5723 5723 5209 5723 5723
table 6 - Works’ duration, estimated hazard ratios from cox-PH models
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